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Oil and gas is a major source of energy worldwide. Therefore its significance for 
Nigeria as a major producer cannot be understated. Notwithstanding the huge 
revenue derived from oil and gas, its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is minimal. This can be ascribed to the fact that there has been minimal 
indigenous participation in oil and gas projects as this has often been undertaken by 
the International Oil Companies (IOCs). To address this, the Federal Government 
awarded marginal fields and oil blocks to independent indigenous oil companies and 
enacted the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act in 2010. This 
has been of great benefit to indigenous participation. However, these indigenous 
companies often encounter a major problem in accessing finance for their projects.  
This dissertation examines the challenges to financing faced by the independent 
indigenous oil companies and how project financing will be the best means of 




1.1  Introduction 
Petroleum is a major source of energy worldwide and the foremost revenue 
earner for the Nigerian economy.
1
 Oil and gas projects in Nigeria are usually 
undertaken by the Nigerian government through the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), the International Oil Companies (IOCs) and the Independent 
Indigenous Oil Companies (IIOCs). The role of the IIOCs in Nigeria is very crucial 
because although it is arguable that the NNPC as the state-owned indigenous oil 
company can undertake the projects, it is necessary to have privately-owned 
indigenous oil companies performing similar roles as the NNPC as this increases the 
revenue accruing to Nigeria, encourages the local content capacity and further 
strengthens the oil and gas sector.   
Financing of oil and gas projects has been a major challenge in Nigeria for the 
IIOCs. This can be attributed to inadequate legal and regulatory framework to 
effectively regulate and monitor the oil and gas sector. Other relevant factors include 
inability of local banks to finance long-term capital intensive projects, the difficult 
operating environment, inadequate technological expertise, perceived high risk of 
IIOCs by financial institutions, opacity and insufficient information on the petroleum 
sector and lack of credible institutions.
2
 All these factors tend to deter indigenous 
participation, investment and the repatriation of profits from the sector in Nigeria.  
In recent times however, there have been concerted efforts by the Nigerian 
government to encourage indigenous participation and consequently, the financing of 
oil and gas projects by the IIOCs. This can be seen in various measures undertaken 
comprising steps to support indigenous participation through the licensing of 
marginal fields to Nigerians, the enactment of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry 
Local Content Development Act in 2010, leasing of oil blocks to IIOCs and the 
                                                             
1Y Omorogbe Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (2001) 3. 
Petroleum and oil and gas are used interchangeably. 
2 Joseph E. Aigboduwa and Michael D. Oisamoje ‘Promoting Small and Medium Enterprises in the 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry’ European Scientific Journal January 2013 edition Vol 9, No.1. 
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drafting of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB).
3
 However, these efforts have not 
resulted in the expected considerable progress. To an extent, indigenous participation 
has improved but the challenge of financing of IIOCs still persists.  
Financing of oil and gas projects often poses a challenge because these projects 
are generally capital intensive, long-term and risky in nature. The cost of a project 
can be as much as $9 000 000 000.
4
 The duration of most projects particularly in the 
upstream sector can range from about five to 50 years.
5
 The Nigerian government 
can solely finance oil and gas projects without recourse to funders. The International 
Oil Companies (IOCs) are also capable of exclusively funding projects as done in 
production sharing contracts and risk service contracts or are in a much robust 
position than the IIOCs in getting funders. On the contrary, the IIOCs are often 
severely hindered by the lack of financing for the projects. Unlike the government 
and the IOCs, they often do not possess the huge financial resources required for oil 
and gas projects. They also face challenges in accessing funds from local financial 
institutions which are only capable of providing short to medium term funds as 
opposed to the long term funds required for the projects.  Furthermore, their limited 
technical expertise and the level of risk involved in these projects puts them at a 
disadvantage in accessing funds from foreign financial institutions.  
1.2 Project Finance 
Financing of oil and gas projects can be achieved through project financing. 
Project financing according to the Black’s law dictionary can be defined a method of 
                                                             
3 NEITI ‘NEITI and the Petroleum Industry Bill’ available at 
http://www.neiti.org.ng/index.php?q=publications/neiti-and-petroleum-industry-bill, accessed on 2 
December 2013. 
The PIB is envisaged to encourage financing when passed into law. 
4 The Dangote Industries Limited estimate the cost of constructing a Petroleum Oil Refinery & 
Petrochemical/ Fertiliser Plant at $9 000 000 000. $3 000 000 000 is to be by way of equity funding 
while the balance of $6 000 000 000 is financed by debt. Thisday Newspaper ‘Bridging Nigeria's 
Infrastructural Deficit via Project Financing’ Thisday Newspaper 25 September 2013, available at 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/bridging-nigerias-infrastructural-deficit-via-project-
financing/159827/, accessed on 8 February 2014. 
About $2 200 000 000 was used in the NLNGPlus project for constructing 2 trains in 2002. NLNG 
‘Facts & Figures on LNG 2013’, available at 
http://www.nlng.com/publications/Facts_Figures_on_NLNG_2013.pdf, accessed on 14 November 
2013. 
5 Nigerian Eye ‘Nigerian banks unable to fund large oil, gas deals’ Nigerian Eye 23 May 2013, 
available at http://www.nigerianeye.com/2013/05/nigerian-banks-unable-to-fund-large-oil.html, 
accessed on 8 February 2014. 
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financing in which the lender looks primarily to the money generated by a single 
project as security for the loan.
6
  
A comprehensive definition of project finance states that: 
“The term “project finance” is generally used to refer to a 
nonrecourse or limited recourse financing structure in which debt, 
equity and credit enhancement are combined for the construction and 
operation, or the refinancing, of a particular facility in a capital-
intensive industry, in which lenders base credit appraisals on the 
projected revenues from the operations of the facility, rather than the 
general assets or the credit of the sponsor of the facility, and rely on 
the assets of the facility, including any revenue-producing contracts 




In other words, nonrecourse means that the debt granted is repaid mainly 
from the project rather than relying solely on its assets or the credit of the sponsor 
while limited recourse means the lenders can rely on the assets of a parent company 
sponsoring a project in special situations.
 8
 The level of risk involved may determine 
how much recourse will be made to the sponsors.
9
 
Project financing is frequently used for long-term, capital-intensive and risky 
projects. 
It is particularly used in developing countries to finance infrastructure 
projects, projects in the oil & gas sector and independent power projects in the 
energy sector among others.
10 
Project financing evolved through the centuries into a vehicle for assembling 
                                                             
6 Bryan Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 9ed (2009) 707. 
7 Scott L. Hoffman  International Project Finance  A Resource for Governments Sponsors Lenders 
Lawyers and Project Participants (1998) 4-5.  
8 Hoffman op cit (n31) 6.  
9 Hoffman op cit (n31) 8.  
10 Hoffman op cit (n31) 24.  
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a consortium of investors, lenders and other participants to undertake projects that 
would be too large for individual investors due to the huge capital required for a 
long-term duration and the level of risk involved. Modern day project finance 
commenced in the 1970’s due to the inability of governments particularly developing 
countries to continue financing infrastructural projects.
11
 
A project comprises the sponsor(s) who coordinates the development of the 
project.
12
 The sponsors create a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) otherwise known as 
the project company using equity or mezzanine debt. Basically, the cash flow of the 
project company is used to repay the loan while the assets act as guarantee to the 
lenders.
13
 The project company has a separate legal personality which is distinct from 
its sponsors.
14
 The project company ceases to exist after the completion of the project 
and its assets may be transferred to the parent company. 
There are different participants involved in financing a project. They include: 
sponsors, project-company (borrower), contractor, financial Institutions, experts, 
advisors, lawyers, lenders, government, lessors, Insurers, suppliers, buyers, export 
credit agencies. The diverse participants in a project enable the project risks to be 
allocated to the parties who are in the best position to manage them.
15
 
Although there are other means of financing a project such as corporate 
finance, project financing appears to be the preferred option.  
Corporate financing can simply be defined as the planning, raising, investing 
and monitoring of finance in order to achieve the financial objectives of the 
company. It can also be defined as: 
‘That part of the theory of finance that is concerned with explaining 
the behaviour of companies in the following policy areas: capital 
structure, capital budgeting, dividends, taxation; and mergers and 
                                                             
11 Hoffman op cit (n31) 26.  
12 Hoffman op cit (n31) 42.  
13 Stefano Gatti Project Finance in Theory and Practice: Designing, Structuring and Financing 








Usually, the board of directors, shareholders and senior management play an 
important role in corporate finance. They decide and plan how the funds should be 
raised. This can be through equity finance or debt finance or the utilization of both 
methods. Equity finance involves the offering of additional shares to existing 
shareholders in the company or offering of shares to new subscribers. Debt finance 
on the other hand encompasses the raising of funds by way of loans, bonds, notes, 
bills and debenture. Before a company can obtain debt financing, a financial 
institution usually assesses the ability of the company to repay the debt and any 
interest payable. This is usually done by examining the balance-sheet of the 
company.
17
  The funds obtained are then used to achieve to achieve the project or set 
objective(s) of the company. 
Despite the advantages of corporate financing, project financing is more 
suitable in financing oil and gas projects. It is often preferred by sponsors because of 
the effective allocation of the high level of risk involved and the access to the high 
capital required for a long period. In comparison, corporate finance is more 
appropriate for short-term projects with limited risks  
Project finance is used to fund projects which are capital-intensive and large-
scale in nature which may not be accomplished with corporate finance. Repayment is 
not based on the credit-worthiness of the sponsors but on the anticipated cash-flow of 
the project while the assets are held as collateral.
18
 Therefore, important 
consideration is placed on the feasibility of the project and the risks involved. The 
cash-flow generated from the project is used to offset the debts and cover the 
operating costs or expenses. There is limited or no recourse to the project-sponsors in 
the repayment of the debt. The means of repayment in corporate financing on the 
other hand is based mainly on the balance sheet and good-will of the company 
although the feasibility of the project may also be taken into account. 
                                                             
16 Peter Moles and Nicholas Terry The Handbook of International Financial Terms (1997) 114. 
17 Hoffman op cit (n31) 11.  
18 Hoffman op cit (n31) 14. 
Gatti op cit (n39) 2.  
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  It should also be noted that risk allocation plays an important role in the 
choice of project financing. Risks are assigned to parties who are best-suited in 
dealing with and minimizing these risks.
19
 Furthermore, project financing is in a 
better position to access foreign direct investment than corporate financing. It also 
provides better interest rates than would have been obtained under corporate 
finance.
20
 Corporate financing often involves equity and debt financing required for 
the company’s operations while project financing mostly comprises debt financing 
rather than equity financing.  
The use of corporate financing for a project may also result in complications 
in decision making between the board of directors of a corporation and the investors 
of a project because usually the board of directors normally make most of the vital 
decisions.  However in a project, the investors of a project would also want to make 
decisions concerning the project. 
On the other hand, corporate finance may be advantageous in terms of 
reduced transaction costs. This arises because in corporate financing, the financing 
structures can be used for a variety of projects while financing structures in project 
finance are often tailored for a specific project which require monitoring and may not 
be suitable for subsequent projects and therefore likely to incur high transaction costs 
and require more time to conclude.
21   
Project finance is therefore appropriate for oil and gas projects undertaken by 
the IIOCs not only because of the risks, huge capital outlay and long-term nature of 
the projects but furthermore because it is unnecessary to examine the balance sheet 
of the IIOCs which are relatively new companies and may not be credit-worthy. 
1.3 A General Overview of the Nigerian oil and gas Sector 
Nigeria is located in West Africa. It has a population of about 170,000,000 
                                                             
19 Gatti op cit (n39) 23. 
20 Hoffman op cit (n31) 18.  







is a natural resource which Nigeria possesses in abundance and 
by virtue of it being an important source of energy required worldwide for different 
purposes, it occupies an important position in the world.
23
 
Nigeria ranks among the ten largest producers of oil and gas in the world and is 
the largest producer of oil in Africa.
24
 It has proven reserves of crude oil estimated at 
38,500,000,000 barrels as at the 1
st
 of January 2012.
25
  It also has the largest natural 
gas reserves in Africa.
26
 Based on the foregoing, it is not surprising that the main 
source of revenue for Nigeria is oil and gas.
27
 By virtue of the Constitution of 
Nigeria and the Petroleum Act, the control and ownership of petroleum resources is 
vested in the state.
28
 
The Nigerian petroleum sector is divided into the upstream, midstream and 
downstream sector.
29
 The upstream sector is involved with the exploration, 
prospecting and production of petroleum. The midstream sector is concerned with 
the transportation of petroleum. This can be done by means of pipe-lines, tankers, 
vessels and rail. The downstream sector deals with the refining, sales and distribution 
of petroleum and is the sector that directly affects people.
30
 The upstream oil sector is 
highly relevant due to its role as the first step in the process upon which the 
downstream process of refining and distribution are dependent. The Petroleum 
                                                             
22 Index Mundi ‘Nigeria Demographics Profile 2013’, available at 
http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html, accessed on 29 July 2013.  
23 Omorogbe op cit (n1) 3. 
24 Index Mundi ‘Country Comparison Oil Production’, available at 
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=88, accessed on 22 August 2013. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration ‘Overview data for Nigeria’, available at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=NI, accessed on 2 December 2013. 
 U.S. Energy Information Administration ‘Nigeria, the largest crude oil producer in Africa is a major 
source of U.S. imports’, available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3050, accessed 
on 22 August 2013. 
25 The World Factbook ‘Country Comparison :: Crude Oil-Proved Reserves’, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2244rank.html, accessed on 6 
November 2013.  
26 KPMG ‘Oil and Gas in Africa Africa’s Reserves, Potentials and Prospects’ available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articles-
Publications/Documents/Oil%20and%20Gas%20in%20Africa.pdf, accessed on 2 December 2013. 
27 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting ‘Nigeria facts and figures’ available at 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm, accessed on 22 August 2013. 
28 Section 44(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
Section 1 of the Petroleum Act. 
29 NNPC Home, available at http://www.nnpcgroup.com/Home.aspx, accessed on 2 December 2013. 




Profits Tax Act (PPTA) is the applicable tax act for companies in the upstream sector 
while the downstream sector is regulated by the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA).  
The exploration of oil in Nigeria commenced in the early 20th century.
31
 The 
earliest legislation on Oil and gas was the Petroleum Ordinance of 1889. 
Subsequently, the Mineral Regulation (Oil) Ordinance 1907 was enacted. The latter 
legislation and the Nigeria Mineral Oil Ordinance (Colonial Mineral Ordinance No. 
17) of 1914 provided that only British subjects and companies were to be granted 
licences and leases to explore for oil.
32
 In 1956, oil was discovered in commercial 
quantity in Oloibiri, Bayelsa state by Shell BP (Shell D’Arcy) which was the sole 
concessionaire in Nigeria at the time.
33
    
From the 20
th
 century to the 1970s, the IOCs were the sole financers of oil 
exploration and production projects in developing countries including Nigeria.
34
  
They had concessions over large expanse of land with a long-term duration. In 
return, the concessionaire(s) paid a minimal sum of money as royalty to the Nigerian 
government. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Nigeria had attained production 
levels in excess of 2 000 000 barrels of crude oil per day. During this period, Nigeria 
did not exercise any significant control and ownership over her oil resources. 
However since the 1970s, Nigeria became an active participant in her oil 
resources and subsequently entered into joint venture agreements and production 
                                                             
31 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation History ‘International Directory of Company Histories’, 
Vol.72. St. James Press, 2005 Funding Universe, available at 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/nigerian-national-petroleum-corporation-
history/, accessed on 30 July 2013.  
32 Section 6 (1) (a) of the Nigeria Mineral Oil Ordinance (Colonial Mineral Ordinance No. 17) of 1914 
provided thus: 
“No lease or licence shall be granted except to a British subject or to a British 
company and its principal place of business within Her Majesty’s dominions: The 
chairman and the managing director (in any) and the majority of the directors of 
which are British subjects.” 
(Despite this provision, a German company was allowed to explore for oil in 1908). 
A similar provision also existed under the Section 7 of the Mining Regulation (Oil) Ordinance 1907. 
33 NNPC History of the Nigerian Petroleum, Industry, available at 
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/IndustryHistory.as
px, accessed on 30 October 2013. 
Discovery of oil in commercial quantities occurs when at least 10,000 barrels of crude oil is produced 
per day. 
34 Hossein Razavi Financing ‘Oil and Gas Projects in Developing Countries’ Finance & Development 
June 1996, Volume 33, Number 2 at 2, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1996/06/pdf/razavi.pdf, accessed on 24 June 2013.  
17 
 
sharing contracts with IOCs. Thus, Nigeria became a financer in her oil and gas 
projects.
35
    
Nigeria was compelled to actively participate in her oil resources as a result of 
several reasons. These reasons comprised the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly’s Resolution No. 626 (VII) on the Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth 
and Resources adopted on 21 December 1952 and  Resolution 1803 (XXII) on 
Permanent Sovereignty over natural resources adopted on 14 December 1962.
36
 Her 
intention to become a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in July 1971 was also a key reason.  
The OPEC is an organization established for petroleum exporting countries with 
the principal aim of unifying the petroleum policies of its members.
37
 In 1968, it 
adopted a Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries which 
recommended that member countries should where possible establish National oil 
companies (NOCs) in their respective countries in order to exercise sovereignty over 
petroleum resources, and to enable them directly undertake the exploitation of their 
oil resources for the benefit of their national development.
38
 Therefore before Nigeria 
joined OPEC, it established a NOC called the Nigerian National Oil Corporation 
(NNOC) for increased participation in the Nigerian oil and gas sector. In July 1977, 
the NNOC was merged with the Federal Ministry of Mines and Power and 
metamorphosed into the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).  
                                                             
35 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation History International Directory of Company Histories, 
Vol.72 St. James Press, 2005, available at http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/nigerian-national-petroleum-corporation-history/, accessed on 30 July 2013. 
36 An excerpt of General Assembly Resolution 626 on the Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and 
Resources provides thus: 
“The right of peoples to freely use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is 
inherent in their sovereignty and is in accordance with the Purpose and Principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
All member states to refrain from acts, direct or indirect designed to impede the 
exercise of the sovereignty of any state over its natural resources.”   
An excerpt of General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources (GAR 1803) states that: 
“The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources must be exercised in the interests of their natural development 
and of the well-being of the people of the state concerned.” 
37 OPEC ‘Brief history’, available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm, accessed on 
22 August 2013. 
38 Resolution XVI.90 Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20690408, accessed on 24 August 2013. 
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From that period, the NNPC on behalf of Nigeria, entered into several joint 
venture arrangements and production sharing contracts with several oil companies. In 
2011, its production rate was about 253 000 000 000 barrels per day (BPD).
39
  
However since the discovery of oil in Nigeria and in spite of the huge proceeds 
generated from oil and gas, Nigeria has often been unable to fund its own share in 
joint-ventures. There have been allegations of mismanagement, corruption and lack 
of transparency in the conduct of NNPC’s affairs which may be due to its exercise of 
commercial and regulatory roles.
40
  
In the same vein, despite Nigeria’s huge reserves of natural gas and its numerous 
advantages over oil including its being a cleaner source of energy and environmental 
friendly quality, usefulness in the generation of electricity and the possibility of its 
being the preferred energy resource of the future; little effort has been made to 
develop the production of natural gas commercially. The reverse is the case as 
natural gas is often wasted through the flaring of associated gas and thus, results in a 
loss of revenue for Nigeria.
41
  Gas flaring is due to the inability to finance the 
production in this sector and further ensure the compliance of regulations prohibiting 
the flaring of associated gas.  
Oil and gas projects in Nigeria have been mainly undertaken by the IOCs and the 
NNPC. The IIOCs have until recently, played a minimal role. There have been 
contractual arrangements such as concessions, joint ventures, production sharing 
contracts, and service contracts with IOCs including Shell, Chevron, Total, 
ExxonMobil, Eni, Addax Petroleum (Sinopec), ConocoPhillips, Petrobras, Statoil, 
Hydro, etc. There has been participation by the IIOCs including Seplat oil, Heritage 
oil, Famfa oil, Afren oil etc. They have been involved in joint ventures, production 
sharing contracts, marginal fields and concessions.  
                                                             
39 U.S. Energy Information Administration ‘Analysis of Nigeria’, available at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Nigeria/nigeria.pdf, accessed on 1 July 2013. 
40. Charles McPherson & Stephen MacSearraigh ‘Corruption in the Petroleum Sector’ in J Campos & 
S Pradhan (ed) The Many Faces of Corruption, Tackling Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level (eds) 
(2007) 200–201, available at 
http://sate.gr/nea/The%20Many%20Faces%20of%20Corruption.pdf#page=225, accessed on 2 
December 2013. 
41 Associated gas is natural gas which is normally found with crude oil in oil wells and may be flared 
when extracting the oil. 
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The advent of the IIOCs participation was commenced during the President 
Ibrahim Babangida’s regime in which awarded licences to several IIOCS. This award 
was due to a policy shift to encourage indigenous participation and increase the 
reserve base of petroleum in Nigeria.
42
 The IIOCs included Summit oil, Consolidated 
oil (Conoil), Yinka Folawiyo Petroleum Company Ltd, and Famfa oil. They were 
required to hold a maximum of 60 per cent interest in the concessions which were to 
be operated under sole risk.
43
  
 However, most of the awards resulted in failures because the allocations were 
not made based on the technical expertise and capacity of the IIOCs but were 
discretionary in nature.
44
 Oil blocks were also awarded to 77 IIOCs through bidding 
rounds in 2005, 2006 and 2007.
45
  Presently, only an oil block of the 77 awarded has 
commenced production.
46
 The lack of access to finance has been portrayed as the 
major challenge of the IIOCs holding the oil blocks.
47
  There are presently 173 oil 
blocks awarded, 90 are owned by the IIOCs while the IOCs own 80.
48
  Nevertheless, 
it is discouraging to note that the IIOCs only produce six per cent of the total crude 
oil production and the IOCs produce 94 per cent.
49
   
Due to inadequate technological resources, they may enter into agreements with 
IOCs who are the technical partners for exploration and production. Furthermore, 
they also have joint operating agreements with IOCs who undertake PSCs and JVs. 
For example, Famfa oil was allocated OPL 216 where it held 60 per cent 
participating interest and its technical partners Star Deep Water Petroleum (a 
subsidiary of Chevron Nigeria Limited) and Petrobras held 32 per cent and eight per 
cent participating interest respectively. It was a joint venture in which the IOCs acted 
as the technical partners for exploration and production. 
                                                             
42 Omorogbe op cit (n1) 167. 
43 Omorogbe op cit (n1) 164-170. 
44 Omorogbe op cit (n1) 167-169. 
45  Dayo Oketola ‘Raising production level among indigenous oil operators’ Punch Newspapers  31 
October 2013, available at http://www.punchng.com/business/energy/raising-production-level-among-
indigenous-oil-operators/, accessed on 8 February 2014. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid. 
48  Vanguard Newspapers ‘How we award oil Blocks - FG’ Vanguard Newspapers 19 March 2013, 
available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/03/how-we-award-oil-blocks-fg/, accessed on 8 
February 2014. 
49  Ibid. 
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Recently there have also been divestments of onshore acreages by IOCs to 
IIOCs.
50
 This has further promoted indigenous participation. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Dissertation 
This dissertation seeks to discuss the challenges in financing oil and gas projects 
by the IIOCs in Nigeria and how project financing is the most preferable means of 
financing in view of the peculiar challenges faced by the IIOCS in Nigeria. This will 
be resolved in the light of existing legal, regulatory and contractual framework in the 
oil and gas sector and other related legislations. 
This dissertation will examine the following issues: 
 The role of the present Nigerian legislations and the legal environment in the 
financing of oil and gas projects especially for the IIOCs. 
 The role of the financial Institutions, multilateral development banks, export 
credit agencies and the capital market in financing oil and gas projects. 
 Legal and regulatory framework in Norway. 
 Recommendations and proposals for IIOCs on financing oil and gas projects. 
The focus of this dissertation is to examine the financing of oil and gas projects 
by the IIOCs. It considers the benefits of project finance for the IIOCs. 
1.5 Structure 
This dissertation has six chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the Nigerian 
oil and gas industry. It also states the reason for the preference of project finance as 
                                                             
50 Thisday Newspaper ‘A New Vista for Nigerian Oil and Gas Independents’, Thisday 29 October 
2013 available at http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/a-new-vista-for-nigerian-oil-and-gas-
independents/162873/, accessed on 27 January 2014 . 
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the mode for financing oil and gas projects. Chapter two examines the legal and 
regulatory framework, contractual agreements and marginal fields in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry. Chapter three discusses the risks involved in oil and gas projects. 
Chapter four addresses the ways of financing oil and gas projects. Chapter five 
examines the Norwegian legal framework for its upstream oil and gas sector. Chapter 
six which is the final chapter proposes possible recommendations and solutions for 

















2. LEGAL, REGULATORY AND CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
OIL AND GAS IN NIGERIA 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter will examine the role of legislations and regulatory 
bodies governing oil and gas in Nigeria and the different contractual 
agreements for the exploration and production of oil and gas in Nigeria 
particularly with respect to IIOCs will be discussed. The importance of 
marginal fields and its role in increasing indigenous participation and revenue 
of the government will also be analysed. It will propose the challenges faced 
and the possible solutions to these issues. 
 
The legal and regulatory framework for oil and gas in a country is 
made up of its national laws, regulatory bodies and International law. It goes 
a long way in determining the growth and monitoring the performance or 
effectiveness of the sector. The importance of the legal and regulatory 
framework cannot be underestimated as it greatly influences the level of 
investment to be attracted to the sector. 
 
In Nigeria, there are several laws and regulatory bodies operative for 
the sector. Nonetheless, the sector performs below the standard expected 
compared with its contemporaries in other nations. This can be due to the fact 
that the laws are not in line with global trends in the oil and gas industry and 
the regulatory bodies are sometimes inefficient. 
  
The contractual agreements for the exploration and production of oil in 
Nigeria are determined by different factors which are inclusive of the level of 
technology and financial resources. 
 
2.2 Legal Framework  
 
2.2.1 The Constitution  
Section 44(3) of the Constitution vests ownership of oil and gas in the 
23 
 
government of Nigeria. It states thus: 
 
‘Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire 
property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas 
in under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the 
territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall 
vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in 
such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly’.  
 
2.2.2 Petroleum Act and Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 
The Petroleum Act 1969 and its attendant Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production) Regulations 1969 are the primary legislations governing oil and 





They provide the basis for production and development of petroleum 
through exploration, prospecting and production. This includes providing 
rules for the issuance of oil exploration licences, oil prospecting licenses and 
oil mining leases which will be discussed subsequently.
52
 The Petroleum Act 
also allows for marginal fields.
53
 Its provisions are implemented or 
supervised by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, NNPC and Department 
of Petroleum Resources. 
 
2.2.3 Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA) 
The Petroleum Profits Tax Act imposes tax on income from 
petroleum operations on upstream companies in Nigeria. The charges are 
based on the profits made during an accounting period. The PPTA provides 
that the tax income on upstream operations is payable at the rate of 85 per 
cent of its chargeable profits for that period, or 65.75 per cent in the first five 
years of the company’s operations in cases where the capital expenditure of 
the company is considered.
54
 For Deep Offshore and Inland Basin PSCs, the 
tax rate is 50 per cent of the chargeable profits for the duration of the PSC.
55
  
                                                             
51 Section 1 of the Petroleum Act.  
52 Section 1 of the Petroleum Act.  
53 Paragraph 17 of the First Schedule of the Petroleum Act.  
54 Section 21(1) and (2) of the Petroleum Profits Tax Act. 




2.2.4 Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract Act 
The Act regulates all production sharing contracts. It also governs the 
taxation of production sharing contracts. This Act gives incentives in the 
form of reduced fiscal rates to Deep Offshore and Inland Basin PSCs. The 
PPT rate is 50 per cent while royalty is payable by companies operating in the 
inland basin at the rate of 10 per cent while companies operating in deep 
offshore pay rates ranging from 0 per cent to 12 per cent. 
 
2.2.5 Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 
This Act is otherwise known as the Local Content Act. It was enacted 
in 2010 to encourage indigenous participation in the oil and gas industry. It 
gives Indigenous companies in Nigeria priority in several areas including in 
the allotment of oil field licences and in projects where contracts may be 
granted in the oil and gas industry provided the companies possess the 
equipment, personnel and capacity to carry out the necessary work.
56
  
Section 3 states that: 
(1) Nigerian Independent Operators shall be given first 
consideration in the award of oil blocks, oil fields licences, 
oil lifting licences and in all projects for which the 
contract is to be awarded in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry subject to the fulfilment of such conditions as may 
be specified by the Minister. 
(2) There shall be exclusive consideration to Nigerian 
indigenous service companies which demonstrate 
ownership of equipment, Nigerian personnel and capacity 
to execute such work to bid on swamp and land operating 
areas of the Nigerian oil and gas industry for contracts 
and services contained in the Schedule to this Act. 
(3) Compliance with the provisions of this Act and the 
promotion of the Nigerian Content shall be a major 
criterion for award of licences, permits and in any other 
                                                             
56 Section 3(1), (2) and 70 (c) of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act. 
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interest in bidding for oil exploration, production, 
transportation and development or any other operations in 
the Nigerian oil and gas industry.’ 
It aims to increase indigenous participation by encouraging the use of 
local materials and indigenous human resources. It also facilitates indigenous 
technological expertise through transfer of technology.  
2.2.6 The Draft Petroleum Industry Bill 
In order to correct some of the anomalies associated with petroleum 
laws and their regulatory bodies and ensure conformance with global 
practices on oil and gas, a Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was proposed. The 
Bill was drafted by the Oil and Gas Sector Reform Implementation 
Committee (OGIC) which was set up in 2007 because of the need to reform 
the oil and gas sector.
57
 The PIB was drafted in 2008 and introduced to the 
National Assembly where it underwent several amendments and had several 
versions. To avoid confusion, a new draft bill was re-submitted to the 
National Assembly in 2012 for consideration prior to its passage and 
enactment as an Act. 
The PIB provides a regulatory framework for the oil and gas sector. It 
seeks to stimulate the much-needed reform and enhance transparency and 
accountability. It proposes to harmonise the dispersed laws and address its 
numerous challenges. The objectives of the PIB include: 
 
“(a) create a conducive business environment for petroleum 
operations, 
(b) enhance exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources 
                                                             
57 Omowumi Iledare ‘An Appraisal of Oil and Gas Industry Reform and Institutional Restructuring in 
Nigeria’, available on http://www.iaee.org/documents/newsletterarticles/408wumi.pdf, accessed on 3 
December 2013. 
The OGIC was originally set up in 2000 but was unable to complete its assignment. 
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in Nigeria and for the benefit of the Nigerian people, 
(c) optimize domestic gas supplies, particularly for power 
generation and industrial development, 
(d) establishing a progressively fiscal framework that encourages 
further investment in the petroleum industry while optimising revenues 
accruing to the Government, 
(e) establishment of commercially oriented and profit driven oil 
and gas entities.  
(g) create efficient and effective regulatory agencies.  
(h) promote transparency and openness in the administration of 
the petroleum resources of Nigeria. 
(i) promote the development of Nigerian content in the petroleum 
industry and  
(k) attain such other objectives to promote a viable and 




The Bill also proposes to repeal, review and harmonise 16 legislations 
regulating the oil and gas sector.
59
 
Section 284 to 288 of the PIB seeks to promote indigenous 
                                                             
58 Section 1 of the draft Petroleum Industry Bill. 
59 These include: the the Petroleum Act 1969 (PA), and all amendments, subsidiary legislation, 
regulations and  instruments enacted under it; the Petroleum Technology Development Act 1973; the 
Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979; the Petroleum Equalisation Fund Act 1989; the Oil Pipelines 
Act 1965;the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 1997, the Petroleum Products Pricing 
Regulatory Agency Act 2003; the Oil Terminal Dues Act, and the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 
1968,The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010, the Deep Offshore and 




The PIB also makes provision for the creation of Petroleum Host 
Community Fund to render financial assistance for the development of the 
petroleum producing communities. This will be useful in mitigating political 
risk. Risks will be addressed in chapter 3. The funds will be derived from all 
upstream companies which are to make a monthly payment of 10 per cent of 
its net profit.
60
 This will assist in combating insecurity in the Niger-Delta 
region and inevitably lead to increased investment in the long-run.  
Section 194 of the PIB provides for assignment, mergers and 
acquisitions. Section 194(1) deems the acquisition and exchange of shares of 
a licensee, lessee or production sharing or joint venture contractor as an 
assignment. Section 194(2) further requires that such assignments obtain the 
prior written consent of the minister for Petroleum. These provisions affirm 
the judgement held in Moni Pulo v Brass Exploration Company Ltd.
61
 This 
case addressed the issue whether a share transfer amounted to an assignment 
in a company and if the minister’s prior written consent was required for the 
share transfer. The facts of the case were that the Brass Exploration 
Unlimited (Brass Exploration) and Moni Pulo Limited (Moni Pulo) were 
counterparties to a joint operating agreement on Oil Mining Lease 114. In 
2004, the Brass Exploration Unlimited assigned its 40 per cent interest to 
Petroleum Oil and Gas Group of South Africa Limited (PetroSA) with the 
consent of the minister. This assignment was by way of a share transfer to 
PetroSA. In 2011, PetroSA transferred the 40 per cent shares formerly held 
by Brass Exploration to the CAMAC Group without the prior consent of the 
minister as required under Paragraph14 of the First Schedule to the Petroleum 
Act and Regulation four of the Petroleum Drilling Regulations. On this basis, 
the Plaintiff filed an action that the prior consent of the minister was not 
obtained. The Court held for the Plaintiff that the assignment was invalid as 
the requirement of the Petroleum Act was not adhered to, despite compliance 
with the law governing the share transfer.  
                                                             
60 Section 118 of the draft Petroleum Industry Bill. 
61 Moni Pulo v Brass Exploration Company Ltd (2012) 6 CLRN 153. 
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The Bill also supports indigenous participation. It gives preference to 
Indigenous Oil Producing Companies (IOPCs) with a low daily production 
rate. For example, there will no participation rights in such IOPCs. It equally 
favours IOPCs by granting OPLs which have been returned, revoked or 
cancelled. 
The proposed PIB is also a source of concern to IOCs. The delay in its 
passage especially with respect to the proposed increase of the fiscal regime 
has caused a level of uncertainty among investors. This has led to a reduction 
in investments as there has been a wave of divestments of onshore assets by 
IOCs to mostly IIOCs or other IOCs. However, the IOCs have justified this 
move by stating that the divestments are to encourage indigenous 
participation and also enable them to move to deep offshore acreages which 




2.3 Regulatory Bodies 
 
2.3.1 Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
The ministry is authorized by the Federal Government of Nigeria to 
introduce new policies for the oil and gas sector and administer the execution 
of approved policies.
63
 It has several departments and agencies to which it 
delegates the execution of policies. Paramount among them is the Department 
of Petroleum Resources and the NNPC. 
 
2.3.2 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
The NNPC is the NOC for Nigeria. It oversees the oil and gas 
industry and plays a vital role by representing the Nigerian government in 
                                                             
62 World Finance ‘Oando’s Nigeria oil and push’, available on 
http://www.worldfinance.com/markets/energy/oandas-nigerian-oil-and-gas-push, accessed on 3 
December 2013. 
Joe Brock ‘Analysis: Oil majors to stay onshore Nigeria despite grumbles’, Reuters 8 August 2013 
available on  http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/08/us-nigeria-oil-analysis-
idUSBRE9770DN20130808, accessed on 3 December 2013  
63 Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources, available at http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-
06-51/executive-branch/104-federal-ministry-of-petroleum-resources/184-ministry-of-petroleum-
resources?showall=1&limitstart=, accessed on 22 November 2013. 
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investments with IOCs. The preamble of the NNPC Act authorizes it to be 
involved in all commercial activities relating to the Petroleum industry. 
 
  It has 12 subsidiaries or strategic business units of which the National 
Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS) is in charge of 
managing Nigeria’s investment and interests in the upstream sector of the oil 
and gas industry.
64
 NAPIMS plays the role of partner in JV assets and is the 
concessionaire in PSC arrangements. However, the role of NAPIMS does not 





2.3.3 Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
This is the regulatory arm of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources.
66
 It 
has the legal duty to ensure that all laws, regulations and guidelines of the 
petroleum industry are adhered to including the monitoring of all activities 
performed under licences and leases. It is also responsible for the collection 
of royalties and taxes.
67
 The DPR also executes the government’s policies in 
the upstream oil and gas sector and grants the licences and leases for the 
exploration and production of petroleum.
68
 In addition, it implements 
environmental laws.  
 
2.3.4 Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
The Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
implements the provisions of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development 
                                                             
64 NAPIMS Profile, available at http://www.napims.com/aboutus.html, accessed on 22 November 
2013.  
NNPC FAQ, available at http://www.nnpcgroup.com/PublicRelations/FAQs.aspx, accessed on 22 
November 2013. 
65 NAPIMS - Roles and Responsibilities, available at http://www.napims.com/oversight.html, accessed 
on 22 November 2013. 
66 Ibid.    
67 Department of Petroleum Resources ‘Functions’, available at http://dprnigeria.org.ng/about-
dpr/functions-of-dpr/, accessed on 25 November 2013. 
68 Department of Petroleum Resources ‘Roles of DPR – Upstream’, available at 
http://dprnigeria.org.ng/dpr-operations/upstream-regulation/roles-of-dpr-upstream/, accessed on 25 
November 2013. 
Department of Petroleum Resources ‘Licences and Permits’, available at 





 It also has the duty of overseeing and organising the Nigerian content 




2.4 Contractual Agreements for Exploration and Production 
Different contractual agreements exist in various countries for the exploration 
and production of petroleum. These agreements are usually made based on the owner 
of the petroleum resources. The needs of the parties, particularly the grantor are also 
taken into consideration.  
By virtue of the Constitution of Nigeria and the Petroleum Act, the control and 
ownership of petroleum resources is vested in the state.
71
 
In the Nigerian oil and gas industry, different contracts have been used for the 
exploration and production of oil and gas. These contracts usually take into account 
Nigeria’s inability to provide sufficient funds, inadequate technical expertise and the 
need to promote indigenous participation.  
The contracts include: 
 Concession 
 Joint venture 
 Production sharing contract 
 Service contracts 
2.4.1 Concessions 
A concession is an agreement between the government of the Host Country 
(HC) and an oil company whereby the HC grants rights to exploration, production 
and development of energy resources to the oil companies.
72
 Concessions are further 
                                                             
69 Section 5 of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act. 
70 Section 4 of theNigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act. 
71 Section 44(3) of the Constitution. 
Section 1 of the Petroleum Act. 
72 Karen Makuch and Ricardo Pereira Environmental and Energy Law (2012) 209. 
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divided into two: traditional concessions and modern concessions. 
 Traditional Concessions 
Traditional concessions were the earliest forms of agreements between host 
countries and IOCs in respect of the exploration and exploitation of oil. They were 
popular in the first half of the 20
th
 century. The parties to the concession were IOCs 
and the HC. The IOCs were usually given exclusive rights of ownership and 
exploration over all mineral resources discovered on the designated land.
73
 
Thereafter, the right to produce, market and transport the oil was also granted if 
petroleum was discovered. Consequently, the IOCs had the unlimited freedom to do 
whatsoever they wished in respect of the oil and gas discovered.
74
     
The IOCs were required to pay certain costs and taxes for these rights. 
Usually, the rent for the concession was negligible and rarely was there any form of 
income taxation imposed until much later.
75
 The quantity or weight of oil produced, 
rather than its value determined the royalties payable.
76
 Often these concessions 
existed for a long period of time, for example 50 years and covered a large 
geographical area.
77
  It has been stated that the rationale behind the use of this 




This type of concession was also in existence in Nigeria. The first concession 
was granted to German Bitumen Company in 1908 for exploration in Ondo State but 
resulted in a failure. In November 1938, Shell D’Arcy Petroleum Development 
Company was granted the second exclusive concession for oil exploration.
79
 This oil 
                                                             
73 Michael Likosky Contracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals 
industries Transnational Corporations Vol.18, No. 1 April 2009, available at http:// 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeiia20097a1_en.pdf, accessed on 27 August 2013. 
74 Ernest E.Smith ‘From Concessions to Service Contracts’ (1991) 27 Tulsa L. J. 493 – 515, available 
at http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss4/3, accessed on 24 August 2013. 
75 Omorogbe op cit (n1)39, where it was stated that payment in the Iraqi Agreement with the 
Khanaquin Oil Company in 1926 was four gold shillings per ton of crude oil produced and saved, and 
the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Getty Oil in 1949, the royalty payable was $00.55 per barrel. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Smith op cit (n70). 
78 Makuch and Pereira op cit (n53) 210. 
79 Shell ‘History in Nigeria 1936-1979’, available at http://www.itll.com.ng/aboutitll/who-we-
are/history/country/first-steps.html, accessed on 27 August 2013. 
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exploration licence covered about 375,000 square miles but this was reduced in 
1959.
80 
After 1960, concessionary rights were also granted to other IOCs such as 
Chevron, Agip, Mobil, Texaco and Elf.
81
   
The terms of these concessions were biased and benefitted the IOCs. Thus, 
they were phased out in the 1970s.
82
 The nature of the concessions was also a major 
factor in the establishment of OPEC.   
 Modern concession 
The modern concession grants an oil company the right to explore, produce, 
market and transport the petroleum in a designated area for a fixed period of time.
83
 
The modern concession was analogous with the traditional concession in certain 
ways. For example, an oil company still retained the right to explore, produce, 
market and transport the petroleum. It mainly differed from the traditional 
concession in that the terms of the latter which were largely biased towards the IOCs, 
were removed or curbed. For example, the right granted was only over the oil 
produced ie it owned the oil only when it was extracted and had no right over the 
area of land where the oil was situate.
84
 Also, the right was restricted to only a 
mineral resource in comparison with the old concession where the concessionaire 
had exclusive rights over all the mineral resources on the area of land.
85
 The duration 
of the tenure and the size of the land area were also reduced.
86
 The royalty, rent and 
tax paid were also greatly increased. 
This type of concession can be categorized as licences and leases.
87
  
                                                             
80 Omorogbe op cit (n1) 17. 
81 NNPC ‘History of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry’, available at 
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/IndustryHistory.as
px, accessed on 24 August 2013. 
82 Likosky op cit (n69). 
83 Jenik Radon The ABCs of Petroleum Contracts: License-Concession Agreements, Joint Ventures, 
and Production-sharing Agreements, available at 
http://openoil.net/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/Chapter-3-reading-material1.pdf, accessed on 15 
August 2013. 
84 Omorogbe op cit (n1) 40. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Smith op cit (n69). . 
87 Francisco Parra Oil Politics: a modern history of Petroleum (2005) 9. 
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Similarly, Nigeria practised the system of modern concession. In the second 
half of the 20
th
 century, there was a shift in Nigeria from the use of the traditional 
concession agreements to the modern concessions due to the minimal gains derived 
from the disproportionate terms of the former.  
There was a vast difference between the terms of the old and modern 
concessions as the tenure of the latter is shorter, the designated area was smaller and 
a higher rate of tax and royalty was now paid.
88
 
In Nigeria, the modern concession is applied through leases. 
The Petroleum Act provides for licences and leases. Section 2 states that a 




 Oil Exploration Licence (OEL): OELs are usually granted for the 
exploration of oil.90 The licence is for a year which can be renewed for 
another year. It covers an area not exceeding 5000 sq miles.91 This 
licence is non-exclusive in nature and basically allows a number of 
companies to explore for oil in a specified area at the same time.92 
This can be done by way of preliminary surveys.93 If a company 
discovers oil, it could then apply for an OPL. 
 
 Oil Prospecting License (OPL): OPLs are for the exploration and 
prospecting of oil.94 Unlike the OEL, it is a right granted exclusively 
for an initial and maximum duration of five years.95 It usually covers 
an area not exceeding 1000sq miles.96 If the licensee makes a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Smith op cit (n70). 
88 Smith op cit (n70). 
89 Petroleum Act. 
90 Section 2(1) (a) of the Petroleum Act. 
91 Item 1 - 3, Schedule 1 of the Petroleum Act. 
 Regulation 2(2) (a) of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Section 15 of the Petroleum Act.  
94 Section 2(1) (b) of the Petroleum Act. 
95 Item 5, 6 and 7, Schedule 1 of the Petroleum Act.  
96 Regulation 2(2) (b) of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969. 
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discovery of oil in commercial quantity, it may thereafter apply to the 
DPR for the OPL to be changed to an OML.97 The licensee may be 
allowed to carry away and dispose of petroleum won during 
prospecting operations.98   
 
 Oil Mining Lease (OML): This lease enables the holder to search for, 
win, work, carry away and dispose of petroleum over an area.99 It is an 
exclusive right granted in respect of a maximum area of 500 sq miles 
and for a duration not exceeding 20 years.100 A lease can only be 
granted when oil is found in commercial quantity and if other 
conditions of the OPL have been complied with.101  
 
The modern concession in Nigeria can be compared with a lease.102 By virtue 
of Section 2(2) of the Petroleum Act, a licence or a lease is granted to a company 
incorporated in Nigeria. Participation rights are usually granted in OMLs for joint 
ventures, production sharing contracts and service contracts.103  
2.4.2 Joint Venture Contracts 
A joint venture in the oil and gas project context is simply defined as when 
two parties or more come together to contribute funds and assets for a business 
transaction involving the exploration and production of oil for the purpose of making 
a profit. It has been described as a way of sharing risks as each party adds different 
and valuable skills to the project.
104
 It allows the parties to share risks, expertise and 
funds. 
Joint ventures allow the HC to have participatory interests and be a partner in 
                                                             
97 Joseph E. Aigboduwa and Michael D. Oisamoje ‘Promoting Small and Medium Enterprises in the 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry’ European Scientific Journal January 2013 edition Vol.9, No.1. 
98 Item 5 - 7, Schedule 1 of the Petroleum Act.  
99 Section 2(1) (c) of the Petroleum Act. 
100 Regulation 2(2) (c) of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969. Item 10, 
Schedule 1 of the Petroleum Act.  
101 Items 8 - 11, Schedule 1 of the Petroleum Act. 
102 Omorogbe op cit (n1)40. 
103 Francisca Nlerum ‘Reflections on Participation Regimes in Nigeria’s Oil Sector’, available at 
http://nials-nigeria.org/pub/NCLR5.pdf, accessed on 31 July 2013. 
104 Hoffman op cit (n31) 50.  
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the project with oil companies. Most importantly, it brought about an increase in 
revenue for the HC in comparison with concessions. The participants of a joint 
venture are required to make specified contributions to the project and also share in 
its risks, benefits and losses.  
Paragraph 34(a) of the first schedule to the Petroleum Act provides for 
participation rights. It states that: 
‘If he considers it to be in the public interest, the Minister may impose 
on a licence or lease to which this Schedule applies special terms and 
conditions not inconsistent with this Act including (without prejudice 
to the generality of the foregoing) terms and conditions as to— 
(a) participation by the Federal Government in the venture to 
which the licence or lease relates, on terms to be negotiated 
between the Minister and the applicant for the licence or 
lease;’ 
The NNPC Act also allows for joint venture agreements. Section 5(1) (g) 
provides that one of the duties of the NNPC includes: 
“Doing anything required for the purpose of giving effect to 
agreements entered into by the Federal Government with a view to 
securing participation by the Federal Government of the Corporation 
in activities connected with petroleum”. 
Section (6) (1) (c) further provides the NNPC with the power to: 
“Enter into contracts or partnerships with any company, firm or 
person which in the opinion of the Corporation will facilitate the 
discharge of the said duties under this Act”. 
The joint venture is the most popular form of contractual agreement in 
Nigeria. The unincorporated joint venture system is used in Nigeria. Ownership is 
36 
 
vested in the partners to the venture unlike the incorporated joint venture where 
ownership is vested in the company incorporated for the purpose of performing the 
exploration and production activities. Nigeria through the NNPC entered into several 
joint ventures through the modern concession - the OML. The NNPC is usually 
designated as the concessionaire while the IOCs are the operators.
105
 The operator is 
responsible for planning a programme for the proposed work and expenses among 
other duties.  
The joint venture is governed by two main agreements. These are: 
1) The participation agreement, and 
2) The operating agreement 
The participation agreement states the interests of the parties. 
The operating agreement which is usually with the NNPC is inclusive of the 
rules which govern the relationship between the parties in the joint venture, duties of 
the parties and each partner’s contribution towards the venture including funding ie 
cash calls obligations. In addition, a Memorandum of Understanding with the Federal 
Government offers fiscal incentives to the oil company which in effect reduce the tax 
and royalty payable by the company.  
There have been several joint ventures between IOCs and the NNPC. Nigeria 
owns a majority share of at least 55 per cent in the 6 joint ventures currently 
operating and which are operated by Shell, Chevron, Elf, Mobil, Texaco and Agip.
106
 
Joint ventures also exist between indigenous oil companies and the NNPC as a result 
of acquisition of onshore acreages divested by IOCs.
107
  Most indigenous companies 
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had to merge to acquire these acreages due to inadequate financial resources. For 
example, Shebah E&P and Platform Petroleum merged to form Seplat Petroleum to 
acquire a 45 per cent participating interest in OML 4, 38 and 41 from Shell, Total 
(E&P) Nigeria and NAOC. Starcrest Nigeria and Eland Oil & Gas were merged into 
Elcrest Exploration & Production Nigeria to acquire OML 40.
108
 
Joint ventures in Nigeria are currently been phased out because Nigeria is 
often unable to contribute its own share of the funding to the joint venture thereby 
leaving the other party(ies) to bear the entire financial burden .  
2.4.3 Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) 
PSCs are also known as Production Sharing Agreements. PSCs are defined 
as: 
“Legal arrangements in which the crude oil produced is shared by the 
parties in pre-determined proportions.”
109
 
Indonesia is regarded as the first country that adapted the PSC for oil and gas 
contracts in the 1960s. It has subsequently been widely used.
110
  
 This type of contract is common in developing countries which lack the 
technical expertise and financial resources required for the exploration and 
production of oil.
111
 Generally, in PSCs the HC has ownership and control of the 
oilfield while the contractor which is an oil company undertakes the exploration and 
production. If there is no discovery of oil, the contractor may not be paid. The 
contractor bears all of the risk and financial burden of oil exploration and production. 
In Nigeria, PSCs are governed by the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin 
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Production Sharing Contracts Act.
112
 PSCs are means of financing oil and gas 
projects. 
The general practice in Nigerian PSCs is that if oil is discovered in 
commercial quantity, royalty oil is first allotted to the NNPC for payment on behalf 
of itself and the IOC. Section 5 of the Deep Offshore Act determines the royalty to 
be paid for deep offshore and inland basins PSCs. Thereafter, the contractor is 
remunerated for its operating costs with a percentage of oil which is referred to as 
cost recovery oil or cost oil.
113
 Tax oil is then allotted to the NNPC to be paid on 
behalf of itself and the IOC.
 114
 The remaining oil is known as profit oil which is then 
shared in a pre-determined ratio between the parties to the contract ie the contractor 
and the NOC.  
In Nigeria, PSCs are often used and preferred to the joint venture agreements 
and can be evidenced by the recent shift from the use of joint-ventures agreements to 
PSCs. This occurred because the Nigerian government is often unable to fund its 
own share of the financing of projects in joint ventures due to its financial 
obligations in other sectors of the economy and the PSCs do not require any financial 
contribution from the HC.
115
 Furthermore, they are used in Deep water acreages 
which usually require a high level of expertise. Thus, this enabled Nigeria to reduce 
or eliminate her financial burden borne in joint venture agreements and also increase 
its rate of production. PSCs do not need to be funded directly by the NNPC as the 
risks are mainly borne by the oil companies who are rewarded by the allotment of 
cost oil, if oil is discovered.
116
 
Section 3 of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Act grants a concession for 
companies in petroleum profits tax at the rate of 50 per cent of chargeable profits 
during the PSCs as opposed to 85per cent paid by companies in onshore or shallow 
waters. In addition, royalties for deep offshore PSCs range from 12 per cent to 0 per 
cent depending on the depth of the water, while inland-basin PSCs are charged a flat 
                                                             
112 Section 1 of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act. 
Section 17 defines Deep Offshore to mean as any water depth below 200 metres.  
113 Section 8 of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act.  
114 Section 9 of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act. 




rate royalty of 10 per cent.
117
  
2.4.4 Service contracts 
Service contracts are also commonly used in countries which want to retain 
total control over their oil resource and have sufficient financial means.
118
 Service 
contracts are similar to PSCs in that the contractor also provides the requisite 
technical expertise for oil and gas projects. Ownership and control is vested in the 
NOC. The duration of this type of contract may be shorter than a PSC as it may be 
for the performance of a specific service. They are not commonly used in Nigeria. 
Service contracts are divided into:  
 Risk service contracts 
 Pure service contracts.  
 
Risk service contract 
In a risk service contract, there are usually two parties: the NOC and the 
contractor. By the terms of the contract, the contractor usually incurs all the expenses 
and bears all the risks involved in the exploration and production except if oil is 
discovered in commercial quantity. If no oil is discovered, the contract is cancelled. 
However, if there is a commercial discovery, the contractor is reimbursed with a 
service fee in cash, although the contract can also provide that the contractor be 
compensated with a percentage of the crude oil. The contractor may also be allowed 
to buy back part of the oil at a discount.
119
  
Pure Service Contract 
In a pure service contract, the contractor usually undertakes the exploration 
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and production of oil on behalf of the NOC. In contrast with the risk service contract, 
the HC bears all the risks and costs of exploration as the contract states that the 
contractor is paid a flat fee for his service whether oil is discovered or not.
120
  The 
contractor is also not entitled to any share in the oil discovered but there may a 
corresponding contract which allows the contractor to purchase part of the oil 
produced in the course of work. Service contracts are not as popular as other forms 
of petroleum contracts. They are mainly used in middle-eastern countries with 
proven reserves. These countries usually lack the necessary technical knowledge but 
have ample funds and want to retain total control over their oil resources eg Saudi-
Arabia. 
2.4.5 Technical Assistance Agreement 
In this type of agreement, an IOC with requisite technical knowledge and 
experience is usually hired by a country as a contractor to perform a specific task in 
any upstream petroleum operation. The HC provides all the funds necessary for the 
project. The contractor is entitled to only a cash payment in return for services 
rendered as determined by the parties. The technical assistance agreement is distinct 
from the other forms of agreement because the contractor cannot have any interest in 
the oil. The contractor works under direction of the management of the NOC and 
therefore this contract encourages transfer of technology.
121
   
Technical assistance agreements have not been used in Nigeria as it is likely 
to be expensive because it is the HC which solely provides the finances required for 
the project. 
2.5 Marginal Fields  
A marginal field has been defined to mean any field that the President may, 
from time to time, identify as a marginal field, while a farm-out means an agreement 
between the holder of an oil mining lease and a third party which permits the third 
party to explore, prospect, win, work and carry away any petroleum encountered in a 
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specified area during the validity of the lease.122 The holder of the lease is regarded as 
the farmor while the third party or licensee is the farmee. 
The Petroleum (Amendment) Act No. 23, 1996 and Guidelines for Farm out 
and Operation of Marginal Fields 2013 are the current relevant legislations for 
marginal fields in Nigeria. 
Probably due to the insufficiency and ambiguity of the definition of a 
marginal field in the Petroleum Act, it was further defined as:  
‘A marginal field is any field that has (oil and gas) reserves booked 
and reported annually to the Department of Petroleum Resources 




The objectives of issuing marginal fields are to expand production capacity, 
augment oil and gas reserves and encourage indigenous participation and technology 
transfer.  
In 2002, Nigeria realised the necessity to boost her revenue by increasing her 
proven oil reserves whilst simultaneously encouraging indigenous participation and 
decided to award marginal fields to indigenous companies.
124
 Consequently, in 2003 
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the President issued 24 licences for marginal fields.125 In 2013, another round of 
bidding for marginal field licences commenced and is presently on-going.
126
 
Marginal fields in Nigeria may be regarded as sole risk contractual 
arrangements in situations where the indigenous producers solely bear the risk in 
developing the marginal fields and may also be operated as a joint venture.
127
 The 
farmor receives royalty from the farmee.
128
   
In this contractual arrangement, the holder of the OML may with the consent 
of the president assign oil fields which are not commercially viable to IIOCs or the 
president may assign fields which have been undeveloped for 10 years after its first 
day of discovery.
129
 These are oil-fields which are often regarded as uneconomical to 
the IOCs for reasons such as its location, low reserves, high cost of production and 
consequently may have been neglected but yet remain attractive to IIOCs.  
Ten years after the issuance of the first set of licences, the marginal fields 
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producing marginal field, that the marginal field has been left unattended for an 
unreasonable time, not being less than ten years; and   




produce crude oil exceeding 100,000 BPD.
130
 This can be said to be a success for the 
Nigerian indigenous oil and gas sector. However, only eight of the 24 holders of the 
marginal fields have commenced production.
131
 There have also been several 
complaints from the present holders. These complaints include the lack of access to 
finance, litigation with technical partners, high taxes, high interest rates, oil theft and 
inadequate technical knowledge.
132
 The licences of fields yet to be developed may be 
revoked and awarded to new holders during the 2013/2014 marginal fields’ exercise. 
The unavailability of funds has been attributed to the fact that as at 2003 when the 
licences were awarded, local banks were poorly capitalized.
133
 Moreover, banks are 
not willing to grant loans to marginal fields if the field is the only security because of 
the high risk of unproductivity. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter addressed the legal framework for the upstream 
sector of oil and gas in Nigeria. Most of the laws are out-dated and not in conformity 
with the state of laws in other oil producing jurisdictions which are regularly 
amended or updated to suit changing realities. For example, the Nigerian Petroleum 
Act was enacted in 1969 and has not undergone any major amendments since then. 
Also, the laws regulating the oil and gas sector are also dispersed therefore making it 
difficult for them to be easily located. Furthermore, the laws do not also encourage 
accountability and transparency in the sector as the NNPC exercises both commercial 
and regulatory functions. On the other hand, the Local Content Act is a favourable 
development to indigenous participation and financing for indigenous companies. 
Since 2010 when the Act was enacted, several IIOCs have become holders of oil 
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blocks which have been divested by IOCs. This feat could not have been achieved 
without the enactment of the Act.  
In relation to the regulatory authorities, their functions are commendable but 
they are not effectively implemented. For example, the DPR prescribes standards and 
guidelines for environmental issues in the oil and gas industry but it is doubtful if 
they are adhered to and enforced. 
The contractual framework in Nigeria has evolved several times to suit her 
needs. From the traditional concession which was used during the colonial era, to the 
modern concession which was modified to grant participation rights to Nigeria to the 
adoption of joint ventures and PSCs. The service contracts have been used albeit to a 
minimal extent. The PSC and the service contracts vest ownership of the petroleum 
in the state, while the JV vests ownership in the state and its partners.  
Presently, the PSC seems to be the most effective form of contract for Nigeria 
as the financing and risks involved in the exploration are borne by the contractor. 
This contract is preferred by the IOCs because of the high level of profit obtainable 
and the frequency of the NNPC’s failure to honour her cash call obligation. It also 
seems ideal for Nigeria because of its financial challenges. However, the use of PSCs 
should be for a limited time as it is not in the best interest of Nigeria. A large 
percentage of the returns from the PSC by way of cost and profit oil is taken out of 
Nigeria as the contractors are mostly IOCs. This denies Nigeria the opportunity of re-
investing the money in the economy or saving the money in local financial 
institutions where it can be accessed for oil and gas projects by IIOCs. The PSC does 
not encourage the transfer of technology which can aid indigenous participation and 
lead to increased revenue for Nigeria. There may also be inflation of the costs of 
exploration and production. Furthermore, there is the risk of the contractor being 
wasteful or slow in execution of duties based on the certainty of the payment of cost 
oil. Nevertheless, the use of PSCs should not be discouraged in its entirety as they 
are useful in encouraging deep-offshore explorations requiring technological 
expertise and financial resources which are presently not available in Nigeria. 
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The introduction of marginal fields and divestment of onshore assets by IOCs 
to IIOCs is a welcome development as this will impact positively on indigenous 
participation and consequently local financing.  
Securing financing is difficult for indigenous companies. Lenders especially 
foreign commercial banks may be cautious of advancing funds due to the high risk of 
non-discovery of oil in commercial quantity especially in the case of marginal field 
holders. The political instability in Nigeria and unknown past performance of the 
companies will also inhibit them from lending money. 
It is proposed that marginal field holders should also adopt project finance as 
a means of financing their projects. They should also consider having technical 
partners where they lack the requisite technical expertise. The government could also 
assist in granting a tax holiday to the marginal field holders. In addition, the 












3 Risks  
3.1 Introduction 
The first chapter tackled the choice of project finance as the most appropriate 
way to finance oil and gas projects in view of several factors including the risks 
involved, while the previous chapter also addressed the different contractual 
agreements in Nigeria through which projects are financed by the designated parties.  
Risk is an important component of project finance. It can be defined as: 
“The uncertainty of a result, happening, or loss; the chance of injury, 




Risk is a major factor which may occasion delay, increased costs, or even 
lead to the failure of a project. The main aim of the funders or lenders of a project is 
to make a profit. Consequently, risk constitutes a hindrance to making a profit. 
Before embarking on a project, the parties conduct a risk-assessment or analysis to 
identify potential risks, the probability of its occurrence, its impact, its management 
and how to structure the project in relation to the risks as this will to a large extent 
decide the project’s viability and profitability.
135
  
The level of risk involved and the extent to which it can be managed is an 
essential factor to the project sponsor and lenders in deciding if the project can be 
undertaken in view of its limited recourse.
136
 The potential risks can be retained, 
shifted or allocated to the appropriate parties to be managed, or mitigated by 
insurance,
 
thereby ensuring the success of the project.
137
 The parties to whom the 
risks are transferred are also compensated in return for the risk taken.
138
 Without the 
proper identification, allocation and management of risks, the lenders may be 
cautious of financing the project. The lenders may require that risks which are not 
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allocated to any party be borne by the sponsor.
139
 Risk may be managed by 
guarantees, contractual arrangements and insurance.  
There are different types of risks in project finance. They include: country 
risks, legal risks and environmental risks.  
In examining the Nigerian oil and gas sector, it can be seen that these risks 
are present and may discourage lenders from advancing funds to the IIOCs. In 
addition, due to the long-term and the capital-intensive characteristics of oil and gas 
projects coupled with the fact that most of the IIOCs have recently commenced 
Exploration and Production (E & P) activities with little or no equity, project finance 
is the preferred option for financing the project as there are several parties to manage 
the risks. 
The risks are discussed below. 
3.2 Country risks  
The success and completion of a project is to a great extent reliant on the HC, 
particularly if it is a developing country. If the country is recognised as possessing 
high-risk, the lenders may not be willing to lend funds, or in the alternative curtail 
the funds allocated to the project. Country risks should be dealt with before the 
commencement of the project.
140
 Usually credit ratings agencies such as Moody’s 
Investors Service and Standard and Poor’s ascribe credit ratings to countries that 
reflect their ability to repay debts and interest timeously and the chances of the 
countries default. Country risks may further be divided into political risks and 
investment risks. 
3.2.1 Political risks 
The political environment of a country can constitute a major source of risk to 
the project and its funders. Political risk is attributed to the political environment of a 
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country and may be beyond the control of the funders and the government. It often 
constitutes the main impediment to lenders of oil and gas projects.
141
 These risks 
may be in the form of expropriation; enactment of new laws or change of laws 
especially in relation with taxation & environment; force majeure eg the outbreak of 
violence or war delay; change of government; change in concession granted; quasi-
political risks which include the failure of the government to grant necessary permits, 
disputes involving breach of contract arising from political, commercial and the 
regulatory authorities in the country.
142
  
The state of insecurity in Nigeria can be categorized under political risk. 
Environmental issues and insecurity in the Niger-Delta area are somewhat 
interwoven as the insecurity can attributed to the socio-economic issues such as the 
neglect and low level of development of the area, poverty of the indigenes of the 
area, arising from environmental pollution.  
Security issues have been a major challenge and source of concern for oil and 
gas projects in the Niger-delta. Recently, there have been numerous cases of 
vandalisations and sabotage of oil pipe-lines and installations. In addition, there have 
been attacks on vessels used for exploration and production, and oil thefts. This 
further degenerated to a high level of insecurity caused by the kidnapping of oil 
workers (especially expatriates) and members of their family who are only released 
after a heavy ransom has been paid.  
This has resulted in a lower output of production of crude-oil and reduction in 
the revenue generated.  In addition, the oil companies expend huge sums on securing 
their projects and workers. Some prospective foreign investors have been deterred 
from investing in Nigeria.  
Due to the high level of insecurity experienced and to encourage investors, 
Nigeria declared an amnesty in 2009 for the militants who are a major cause of 
insecurity in the Niger-Delta region. This amnesty programme encompasses training 
and vocational training for the militants in return for their surrender. The programme 
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seems to have been effective as the rate of kidnapping has decreased, however 
several cases of sabotage of pipelines and oil theft still exists.  
Prior to this, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was also 
established in 2000 to assist the development of the Niger Delta region. It also works 
hand in hand with the oil companies in dealing with various issues including 
environmental problems such as environmental pollution, its prevention and 
control.
143
 In furtherance of its goal towards the development of the region, it has 
embarked on projects to provide infrastructure, quality health care facilities and 
equipment, youth empowerment programs.
144
 
The oil companies are often directly affected by community issues and 
therefore usually manage the risks relating to community issues. The risk is often 
dealt with by the use of each oil company’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
programmes. This involves maintaining a good relationship with the community and 
trying to meet their needs. It can be by way of the provision of social infrastructure, 
for example pipe-borne water, provision of electricity, construction of roads etc., 
employment of the indigenes as workers in the project or on a contract basis in the 
company, construction of medical centres and supply of drugs and medical 
equipment, construction of schools and award of scholarships and economic 
empowerment of the indigenes. Insurance policies are often used by the oil 
companies to mitigate this risk.
 145
  
Section 44 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution provides an assurance against 
expropriation and the right of compensation and access to court in the event of its 
breach.
146
 It states that: 
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“(1) No moveable property or any interest in an immovable property shall be 
taken possession of compulsorily and no right over or interest in any such 
property shall be acquired compulsorily in any part of Nigeria except in the 
manner and for the purposes prescribed by a law that, among other things - 
(a) requires the prompt payment of compensation therefore and 
(b) gives to any person claiming such compensation a right of access for the 
determination of his interest in the property and the amount of compensation 
to a court of law or tribunal or body having jurisdiction in that part of 
Nigeria.” 
Section 25 of the NIPC Act also offers a guarantee against the expropriation 
or nationalisation of any enterprise by the government of Nigeria and in the event of 
its occurrence, it would be on the grounds of national interest or purpose for which 
the law would provide for the payment of fair and adequate consideration. It provides 
thus: 
“(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section:-  
(a) no enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by any 
Government of the Federation;  
(b) no person who owns, whether wholly or in part, the capital of any 
enterprise shall be compelled by law to surrender his interest in the 
capital to any other person. 
(2) there shall not be any acquisition of an enterprise to which this 
Act applies by any Government of the Federation unless the 
acquisition is in the national interest or for a public purpose and 
under a law which makes provision for-  
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   (a) payment of fair and adequate compensation; and  
(b) right of access to the courts for the determination of the investor’s 
interest or right and the amount of compensation to which he is 
entitled. 
(3) Any compensation payable under this section shall be paid without 
undue delay, and authorisation for its repatriation in convertible 
currency shall, where applicable be issued.” 
Political risks can be mitigated by contracts known as government support 
agreements between the government and the parties to the project.
147
 The contractual 
terms helps to create a conducive and enabling environment for the performance of 
the project. For example, the contract may grant certain tax exemptions or reliefs, 
exemption from customs duties on certain importations, easy repatriation of foreign 
exchange and the provision of guarantees on certain guarantees which may be to 
ensure that an important counterparty performs its obligations under the contract. 
In addition, political risks can be managed by guarantees from the project 
sponsor, provision of Partial Risk Guarantees (PRGs) and Insurance from 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to attract investors to finance the project. 
Where the level of the country risk is quite high, the aid of multilateral development 
banks is often resorted to. Insurance can also be by export credit agencies (ECAs) 
and private insurance companies. These will be discussed subsequently.  
3.2.2 Investment risks 
These are economic or commercial risks in a country which may reduce or 
affect the anticipated return on a project. These include currency convertibility and 
repatriation of foreign exchange. Investment risk can be mitigated by establishment 
of special foreign deposit accounts, negotiating exchange agreements with the host 
government and obtaining monetary board or central bank approvals.
148
 The parties 
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may also ensure that revenue obtainable for example from off-take contracts is the 
same currency as that of the loan agreement and of the operating cost.
149
  
  In Nigeria, repatriation of foreign exchange is regulated by the Foreign 
Exchange (Monitoring & Miscellaneous Provision Act No. 17 of 1995) which 
guarantees foreign investors an unconditionally transfer or repatriation of their 
profits and dividends (net of taxes) through an authorized dealer (which may be a 
bank) in freely convertible currency.
150
 Investors are to obtain a Certificate of Capital 
Importation (CCI) from a Nigerian Bank which acts as an agent of the Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) when foreign exchange is brought into the country. 
  The CCI also allows the investor to repatriate the capital at the end of the 
project. Investors may also operate a foreign currency domiciliary account with a 
Nigerian bank which permits the currency to be any internationally convertible 
currency.
151
  Without the CCI, a foreign investor is likely to find it difficult to 
repatriate foreign currency. 
Derivatives may also be used to manage investment risks involving increase 
in interest rates and currency rates. These involve the use of forward contracts, 
futures and options. Take or Pay contracts also assist in mitigating risks. Take or Pay 
Contracts are analogous to World Bank guarantees. It is explained as: 
“A contract requiring the buyer to either purchase and receive a 
minimum amount of a product (“take”) or pay for this minimum 
without taking immediate delivery(“pay”). These contracts are often 
used in energy and oil-and-gas businesses).
152
  
They are often used in financing oil and gas projects and are particularly 
useful as security against most forms of risks and as well serve as an assurance of 
revenue for the sellers and lenders.   
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The above-mentioned contracts are often performed with the assistance of the 




Corruption is another factor which comes into play in Nigeria as it may 
reduce the return on a project.
154
 It often leads to unanticipated costs. The Nigerian 
government has tried to curb this menace by enacting the Corrupt Practices and other 
Related Offences Act, Money Laundering Act and the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission Act, however corruption still persists.
155
  
3.3 Legal Risks  
The enforceability of the contract under the laws of the HC during disputes is 
a key issue with the lenders and the project sponsor. To forestall this, the advice of 
local lawyers in analysing and managing the risk will be required at the initial stage 
of the project. The legal risk arising from the enforceability of a contract is 
influenced by the level of economic development, legal system and institutional 
conditions of the HC.
156
   
The choice of the applicable law and the court to have jurisdiction is also 
relevant in dispute settlement, and should be chosen by the parties when drafting the 
various contracts for the project. This is necessary to avoid delay in deciding the 
applicable law and court as this may inevitably result in increased costs and in few 
cases, to the unsuccessful completion of the project. 
Generally, parties to the project are amenable to submitting their disputes to 
an effective legal system for the fair interpretation and enforcement of obligations or 
claims arising from the contract. However, the law of the HC may not be chosen if 
the legal system of the country is not advanced to suit the specific needs of the 
project. For example, if the judges and lawyers in the HC do not have the expertise 
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and experience in the project area. The law of a major financial centre may be 
preferred by the parties to that of a HC because of it is more advanced.  
In the alternative, the parties may resort to arbitration. Arbitration is a popular 
choice because of it numerous advantages. It is neutral, fast and the arbitrators can 
deal with technical issues unlike litigation where the lawyers may lack the requisite 
expertise. Furthermore, it has the benefit of maintaining friendly relations between 
the parties necessary for the accomplishment of the project. The seat of arbitration 
also determines the procedure to be adhered to in the arbitration. 
The choice of arbitration in Nigeria is advisable especially in light of the slow 
pace of litigation. Therefore arbitration is resorted to in oil and gas issues to prevent 
delays, issues of applicable law of different legal systems, problems of enforcement 
of laws and judgment, and avoid government interference. 
 
The Nigeria courts have acknowledged that in a contract, parties can choose 
the applicable law and which court to have jurisdiction.
157
 Nonetheless, it has been 
held by the Nigerian Supreme Court in Sonnar Limited v Nordwind to oust the 
constitutional jurisdiction of the court, the foreign law in question must be real, 




In order to mitigate legal risk, the contracts must be carefully drafted. The 
assistance of the HC may also be useful in reducing the bureaucracy that may delay 
or increase the cost of enforcing a contract. 
3.4 Environmental Risks  
  These are risks which have an adverse effect on the environment. 
Environmental risks are frequent in the petroleum sector and difficult to determine at 
the onset of the project. In the context of oil and gas, these risks include oil spills, gas 
flaring. It is also necessary to consider the impact of the legislations regulating these 
environmental issues as they may be restrictive and frequently changed during the 
                                                             
157 Olaniwun op cit (n147) 51. 
158 Sonar Limited v Nordwind (1987) 4 NWLR (Part 66) 520 at 543. 
55 
 
duration of the project and therefore have a negative effect on the project. Payment 
of fines, penalties, damages to parties affected by environmental harm and the cost of 
recovery for the damaged area may be expensive and thus, reduce the estimated 
profit due from the project.
159
 Lenders in project finance may also be liable for 
environmental risks, for example in their exercise of step-in rights. Therefore, 
financial institutions such as the World Bank often require compliance with the 
environmental laws of the country and furthermore, have their environmental 




The Niger-Delta region which produces 90 per cent of the oil produced in 
Nigeria has suffered immensely from environmental degradation arising from oil 
exploration and production activities.
161
 These range from gas flaring to oil spills 
which results in the air, land and water pollution. Environmental degradation 
adversely affects farming and fishing activities which are the primary sources of 




  Gas flaring is the burning off of the associated gas found with oil during 
extraction of oil. When drilling for oil, the associated gas may be flared if there is no 
arrangement to produce the gas. Nigeria flares about 40 per cent of its natural gas 
and re-injects 12 per cent to extract oil.
163
 It has been reported that about 23 billion 
cubic metres of natural gas is flared yearly in Nigeria which constitutes 13 per cent 
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 About half of the associated gas produced annually in Nigeria 
amounting to about $2 500 000 000 is flared.
165
 There have also been several cases 
of oil spills in Nigeria which have been blamed on theft and pipeline sabotage. Gas 
flaring and oil pollution have a deleterious effect on the environment.  
There are several legislations in Nigeria regulating pollution in the oil and gas 
sector.
166
 The Environmental Impact Assessment Act stipulates that an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) be conducted: 
"where the extent, nature or location of a proposed project or activity 
is such that it is likely to significantly affect the environment."
167
   
An EIA is mandatory in developing oil and gas fields. 
Nigeria still has one of the world’s worst records of gas flaring despite 
several local and international laws prohibiting gas flaring including the Associated 
Gas Reinjection Act.
168
 Several deadlines set for the prohibition of gas flaring have 
elapsed and have been postponed several times without the prohibitions being 
enforced.
169
   
Environmental practices in the oil and gas sector is mainly regulated by the DPR, 
National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) 
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and National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA). Environmental 
laws in Nigeria are not adequately enforced by the regulatory authorities. Moreover, 
the penalties are not severe enough to deter oil companies in Nigeria from flouting 
them as they prefer to breach the laws and thereafter pay the penalty. 
Litigation is the most accessible option for redress for the members of the 
community when they have been impaired by the environmental degradation but this 
is of limited benefit to them because where compensation or damages are awarded, it 
is often insignificant in comparison with the loss suffered. Consequently, the issue of 
insecurity arises as the perceived injustice .
170
  
  Insurance policies can be used to mitigate environmental risks.171  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the crucial issue of risk which must be carefully 
contemplated before embarking on a project. It addressed country, legal and 
environmental risks. These are risks which can be mitigated under project-finance. 
Although the risks are faced by both the IOCs and the IIOCs, the case of the IIOCs is 
peculiar as most of them are newly established companies and may not easily access 
funds.  
Country risk which was the initial risk treated is further divided into political 
and investment risks. It constitutes the most important type of risk to indigenous 
companies in accessing funds from foreign financial institutions. Generally, lenders 
consider the country risk as a significant factor in the borrower’s ability to repay a 
debt. Insecurity and oil bunkering which are prevalent issues in Nigeria are 
categorised under political risk. It has led to a frequent loss of revenue in oil and gas 
upstream projects and a major reason for the divestment of IOCs from onshore assets 
for deep offshore acreages. As a result, lenders may be wary of advancing funds to 
IIOCs who acquired the divested acreages due to the high risk involved.  
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As stated, Nigeria has endeavoured to manage the risk by offering amnesty to 
the militants involved. Oil companies also render CSR to Niger Delta communities. 
These steps have reduced but not completely eliminated the risk. A way forward is to 
address the main issue which is the grievances of the members of the Niger Delta 
communities who have suffered great losses rather than benefitting from the 
discovery of oil.  
The government also ought to provide infrastructure for the community and 
jobs for the inhabitants whose main sources of livelihood of fishing and farming have 
been destroyed due to oil pollution. The prevention and elimination of oil pollution 
and gas flaring should be critical areas for the government to address through its 
regulatory bodies. These measures will be more effective than those previously 
adopted. The risk of expropriation and repatriation seems slim for now as Nigeria is 
eager to attract investors as it lacks the technical and financial resources to solely 
develop the petroleum sector. 
Legal risk is the second type of risk. The judicial system in Nigeria is 
amenable to the enforcement of contracts. The major drawbacks of litigation in 
Nigeria include the judicial process being slow and the lack of expertise of most 
judges in oil and gas issues. Therefore parties often resort to arbitration or the law of 
another country for dispute settlement. Arbitral awards can be made a judgment of 
the court. In the same vein, foreign judgments can be enforceable when registered in 
Nigerian courts. It is submitted that the Nigerian legal system be reformed so as to 
allow for the speedy dispensation of cases. Judges and judicial personnel should also 
be trained on oil and gas matters.  
The third type of risk is environmental risk. In most countries, environmental 
risk is very essential and given paramount consideration in the financing of most oil 
and gas projects as most projects are required to have complied with global 
environmental standards before lenders can agree to fund projects. Furthermore, 
remedying environmental damage and payment of their penalties are usually very 
costly. However in Nigeria, the reverse is the case as the regulatory bodies have 
often failed to enforce the environmental laws regulating oil and gas and the 
penalties are considerably minimal. Therefore, oil companies prefer to pay a penalty 
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for contravening environmental laws rather than adhere to environmental laws or 
remedy the environmental damage done because it is a cheaper.  
The resultant effect is the state of insecurity in the Niger Delta region which 
in turn leads to a loss of revenue and a minimal level of uncertainty as to the future 
of oil and gas projects. This can be averted if environmental laws such as the EIA are 
complied with and the regulatory bodies perform their roles effectively. The sanction 
imposed on environmental damage should be heavier to deter offenders. 
The draft Bill (PIB) attempts to redress this malady by imposing grave 
penalties for defaulters. The proposed creation of the Petroleum Host Community 
Fund for the development of the petroleum producing Communities will also be 



























Funding can be obtained from different sources for oil and gas projects. 
Formerly, financing of these projects were by HCs through budgetary allocation and 
by IOCs. However, due to most HC’s financial obligations to other sectors of the 
economy and the IOCs reluctance to solely finance the projects, other local and 
foreign sources of funding had to be examined. Generally, financing occurs through 
debt and equity. As project finance has been stated to be the best means of financing 
for projects by IIOCs, debt finance which dominates project finance will mainly be 
considered. Financing need not be in monetary form only but can also be by way of 
assistance through guarantees by MDBs to the public and private sector. 
One of the major challenges of the IIOCs has been the issue of funding. In 
financing an oil and gas upstream project, most financial institutions especially the 
foreign institutions put weighty consideration on factors such as the risks and the 
price of oil which determines the feasibility and rate of return on the investment. The 
ability of the borrower to repay is also taken into account, and the lender may require 
a form of security such as take or pay contracts for gas projects. 
 Although there are various sources for project finance, most of the funds 
obtained for projects in Nigeria have been sourced from foreign banks. Previously, 
the local banks were not capable of providing the amount of funds required for such 
projects but in recent times have seemed able to do so by means of loan 
syndication.
172
 It will be preferable if the IIOCs utilize the services of local 
commercial banks as this ensures that the profits and interest remain in Nigeria.  
4.2 Equity 
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4.2.1 Capital Markets 
This involves raising funds for the project through the issuing of securities. 
This can be on the primary or secondary market by trading in equity or debt 
securities. Equity involves the selling of ordinary and preference shares in the capital 
market. It is regarded as an Initial Public Offer (IPO) it is the company’s first time of 
selling shares. Subsequent sales are referred to as Public Offers. Listing on the Stock 
Exchange has several advantages for companies, in that it provides an easy access to 
funds from the public and also gives the company prominence and credibility 
Nevertheless only ten oil companies are listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange and 
the only IIOC among them is Oando, which is an indigenous integrated oil and gas 
company.
173
 The capitalization of the oil and gas sector is N235 170 000 000 
representing 1.49 per cent of the total market capitalization.
174
 The listing 
requirements of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) can be daunting for new 
companies. It stipulates that in order for a company to be listed, it must submit its 
financial statements and business records for the past five years with audited 
accounts of not more than nine months.
175
 Furthermore, the level of liquidity of the 
NSE is too low to finance oil and gas projects.
176
   
Recently, IIOCs involved in exploration and production activities began listing their 
companies on foreign stock exchanges in order to fund their projects. These 
companies include Afren Oil, Heritage Oil, Eland Oil and Gas, Lekoil, Mart 
Resources and MP Nigeria which are listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Lekoil in recent times raised the sum 
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The raising of funds through the bond market in Nigeria is also being proposed by oil 
companies in resolving the issue of financing oil and gas projects.
178
  
4.2.2 Private Equity 
 This involves when a group of investors usually institutional or private 
investors commit their funds to a private company or buy-out and delist a public 
company in order realise a profit at the exit point. Private equity is not a popular 
means of financing in Nigeria. 
 
4.3 Debt 
4.3.1 Financial Institutions / Commercial Banks 
A financial institution can be defined as: 
‘A business, organization or other entity that manages money, credit, 
or capital, such as a bank, credit union, savings-and-loan association, 
securities broker or dealer, pawnbroker, or investment company.’
 179
  
Commercial banks can therefore be categorised under financial institutions. 
A commercial bank has been described thus: 
‘A bank authorized to receive both demand and time deposits, to make 
loans, to engage in trust services, to issue letters of credit, to rent 
time-deposit boxes, and to provide similar services.”
180
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Commercial banks offer loans to finance oil and gas projects. These loans can 
be senior loans, junior loans and mezzanine loans. Loans especially senior loans 
usually require some form of security.  
 Nigerian banks 
Commercial banks in the performance of its service of giving loans have a 
vital role to play in financing oil and gas projects particularly for IIOCs. Until 
recently in Nigeria, there was little or no information obtained on the funding of oil 
and gas projects by commercial banks in Nigeria. This can be due to the fact that the 
operations in the oil and gas sector were often shrouded in secrecy. In addition, local 
commercial banks had previously played a limited role in funding oil and gas 
projects due of its low level of liquidity and its inability to provide long-term loans 
for capital-projects.
181
  As a result, funding was mainly sourced from foreign banks. 
In 2004, there was a restructuring of the Nigerian banking sector that 
mandated commercial banks to increase their capital base from N2 billion to N25 
billion. In 2009, there was another restructuring and intervention in the Nigerian 
banking system by the CBN which increased the capitalization of the banks.
182
 
These changes seem to have improved the financial position of the Nigerian 
commercial banks as they are becoming active players in the oil and gas industry. In 
2009, there was a $265 000 000 supplementary refinancing deal for ExxonMobil and 
the NNPC which was closed in London and arranged by eight Nigerian banks 
including United Bank of Africa, Oceanic Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Skye 
Bank, Zenith Bank, Bank PHB, Access Bank and Union Bank.
183
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Generally, a Nigerian bank cannot solely finance oil and gas projects because 
of the huge capital required for long term. It would also want to limit its exposure to 
the risks involved.  Therefore, funding can be obtained by using a syndication of 
local banks or international banks.
184
 Some Nigerian banks have set aside funds for 




 Foreign banks 
On the other hand, foreign commercial banks when lending money to finance 
oil and gas projects require the following: 
‘A viable project; 
Backing of a strong sponsor; 
Sustainable macro-economy in the country; 
Cash-flow from the project used for payment.’186 
 
Furthermore, issues such the current level of insecurity, cash flow 
projections, environmental concerns and country risk are taken into account in 
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 These factors may also increase the cost of funding.
188
 Foreign 
commercial banks are cautious of lending money to countries with high political risk. 
4.3.2 The African Finance Corporation (AFC) 
The AFC is an African financial institution established in 2007 which 
provides financing for infrastructure, natural resources, power, transportation and 
telecommunication on the continent.
189
 Presently its membership is drawn from West 
African countries. It has financed several projects in Nigeria, Ghana, Cape Verde, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and South Africa among other countries.
190
 It finances projects 
through debt, equity and guarantees.  
The AFC contributed a sum of $20 000 000 as equity investment in Seven 
Energy, an indigenous oil and gas exploration and production firm. The investment 
constituted part of a $200 000 000 equity and debt raised by Seven Energy, 




In 2011, the AFC was a Joint mandated lead arranger with Access Bank in 
$150 000 000 senior debt syndication where it invested $80 000 000. The loan 
facility was to assist Neconde Energy, an indigenous oil company in the upstream oil 




4.4 Multilateral Development Banks 
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Multilateral Development Banks offer financial assistance and analogous 
professional advice for developing countries.
193
 They are very essential in funding 
projects in developing countries as they are prominent participants in privatisation 
policies, provide financial assistance in countries with high political risk, and 
encourage financing in the private sector.
194
  
Membership of MDBs is drawn from both developing and developed 
countries and is not restricted to a particular region despite the bank’s location. 
MDBs denote the World Bank Group and the following regional development banks: 
 The African Development Bank (AfDB). 
 The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). 
 The Asian Development Bank. 
 The Inter-American Development Bank.   
For the purposes of this dissertation, it will suffice to discuss only the World 
Bank Group and the AfDB. 
4.4.1 The World Bank Group 
The World Bank Group is made up of five institutions: the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Financial Corporation 
(IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and the International Development 
Agency (IDA). The IBRD, IFC, MIGA are important institutions in project finance 
especially in financing oil and gas projects. The Bank's role is intended to be 
primarily that of a catalyst.  
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4.4.2 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)  
The IBRD which is otherwise known as the World Bank was established in 
1944 and caters for developing countries with average income and high credibility.
195
  
It provides long-term finance for infrastructural projects. The World Bank assists in 
creating a conducive environment to encourage financing by the private sector. This 
is done through provision of loans, guarantees, technical assistance and rendering of 
advice on diverse issues. Furthermore it assists in financing oil and gas projects by 
providing guarantees for the loans from the lenders against the country’s political 
and economic risk. For the World Bank to lend money for a project, it must be 
considered successful ie have a ten per cent rate of economic return.196  
The World Bank also ensures that adherence to best environmental practices 
and requires the HC to maintain transparency in the management of the oil revenue 
and protection of the public interest.
197
 The World Bank is better suited to deal with 
political risk better than commercial banks. 
Loans from the World Bank can occur in two forms. Firstly, it can be directly 
to the project company. It can also lend funds to the HC which re-lends it to the 
project company. The direct lending to a project company entails a loan agreement 




The World Bank also offers PRGs to countries eligible for borrowing from 
the IBRD and IDA.
199
 They are used in private sector investments to protect lenders 
against political risk. It guards against risks by government of the HC such as 
currency convertibility, expropriation, change of law and breach of contract. In 
return, the government of the HC covers risks such as political violence, war and 
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expropriation and indemnifies the IBRD for the repayment of any advances made to 
the lenders under the PRG.
200
 This is set out in a government support agreement. 
This guarantee is not popular in project finance as it is mostly accessible to investors 




4.4.3  International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
The IFC is a member of the World Bank and was established in 1956. It is the 
largest global development organisation whose emphasis is on the private sector in 
developing countries.
202
 It plays an important role in the financing of projects 
including oil and gas projects by providing long-term loans, guarantees and equity 
financing, and risk management and advice among other services.  
The main aim of the IFC in relation to project finance is to encourage the 
development of the private sector and mitigate country risks in terms of breach of 
contract, convertibility and expropriation.
203
 Its participation in a project is similar to 
a World Bank guarantee as its presence in the project enhances its success which is 
important to the lenders and investors.
204
 Its major difference from the World Bank 
lies in the fact that the World Bank financing is geared towards the public sector 
while the IFC focuses on the private sector and does not necessitate the guarantee of 
the government of the HC to finance a project.
205
 However, the IFC can also provide 
financing for a project that the public sector is involved in, if it has a private investor 
and the aim of the project is to make a profit.
206
 
The IFC also expects that the project must be of benefit to the investors and 
economy of the HC and must comply with the required environmental standards. 
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The IFC grants loans, equity, derivatives and partial credit guarantees. 
The loans granted can be categorized into two:  
 The A – loan program which are loans granted solely by the IFC to the 
borrower, and 
 The B – loan program which is a loan is granted by the IFC to the borrower 
but syndicated by the IFC to commercial lenders. Repayment by the borrower 
is to the IFC and not the commercial lenders directly, as the IFC is the lender 
on record. 
The IFC may also acquire equity of about five per cent to about 35 per cent in the 
SPV. It does not seek to have a controlling interest in the project. There may be a 
possible conflict of interest where the IFC occupies a dual position of a shareholder 
and a lender. 
The IFC offers derivatives such as swaps, options, forward contracts to assist 
in mitigating risks. Derivatives are useful for developing countries as the IFC acts as 




4.4.4  Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
MIGA is a member of the World Bank group. It was established in 1988 to 
encourage foreign direct investments in developing countries.
208
 MIGA plays an 
important role in managing political risks and protecting investors in the World Bank 
member countries especially in countries where businesses are difficult to operate. 
This is achieved by the provision of political risk insurance guarantee which covers 
equity and debt. MIGA is the only agency that provides insurance against political 
risk.
209
 It covers political risk in the oil and gas sector including transfer restriction & 
currency convertibility, expropriation, tariff, regulatory and credit risks arising from 
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4.5 Regional Development Banks 
These are MDBs that have similar aims with the World Bank Group but cater 
for the needs of a specific geographical area in which they are located. They will be 
discussed briefly in connection with project financing particularly in oil and gas. 
4.5.1  The African Development Bank (AfDB) 
The AfDB was established in 1964 and commenced operations in 1966. It is 
made up of 77 member states comprising 53 African countries and 24 non- African 
countries and aims to promote the economic and social growth of its regional 
members.
211




The AfDB provides financial assistance to both the public and private sector 
through loans, equity investments of either ordinary or preferred shares in a SPV and 
provision of PRGs to private investors to cover government risks. In addition, it also 
renders technical assistance and advisory services.
213
  
The AfDB has provided financial support for few oil and gas projects in 
Africa. In 2010, the AfDB financed the Hasdrubal oil and gas field development 
project in Tunisia with a $150 000 000 corporate loan. The loan agreement was 
entered into and signed by the AfDB Group and the Enterprise Tunisienne 
d'Activités Pétrolières (ETAP) which is the Tunisia State oil corporation and the 
project includes the construction of a stand-alone gas, condensate and oil production 
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system, an offshore gas pipeline, six offshore horizontal producing wells.
214
 The 
project is a joint venture by British Gas Tunisia Limited and ETAP and is expected 
to be a source of revenue for the government.  
The AfDB has been supportive towards some of its infrastructural and 
agricultural projects.
215




4.6 Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) 
ECAs are used when the level of commercial and political risk in a project is 
considered high as they lower the risk of private lending and therefore, they have 
featured prominently in project finance.
217
 They are often used when the SPV situate 
in a developing country needs to import plants or equipment required for the 
project.
218
 They can be privately or state-owned, and are particularly useful in 
facilitating International trade. They serve as a guarantee for lending facilities.
219
 
They can cover political risk solely or with business and other risks.
220
 They can also 
provide direct loans to exporting companies operating in their home country and 
loans to the importing SPV which may be in the form of direct lending, intermediary 
(or indirect) lending, and interest rate equalization.
221
  
Direct lending to the SPV occurs when the ECA grants a loan to the SPV 
which may be at a subsidized interest rate to procure goods or services from the 
ECA’s country. Intermediary or indirect lending arises when the specific ECA lends 
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the money to a financial institution (for instance, a commercial bank which acts as a 
liaison between the ECA and the SPV), which then lends to the SPV at a reduced 
interest rate. Interest rate equalization entails lending to SPVs by commercial banks 
at below market interest rates and is reimbursed by the agency for the difference 
between the below-market rate and the commercial rate.   
Examples of ECAs include MIGA, Overseas Credit Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), US Export-Import bank (US Ex-Im bank) and the Exports Credit Guarantee 
Department (ECGD). 
ECAs in some situations may not be relevant for project finance as most 
ECA’s offer their services on a short-term basis.
222
 
Major ECAs belong to the Berne Union (International Union of Credit and 
Investment Insurers), which promotes international coordination and exchange of 
information in this sector.
223
  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Consensus 
regulates the total financing activities of ECA’s and is usually signed by its 
members. It seeks to organize the export credit market and prevent disagreements 




An example of a Nigerian oil and gas project which had the support of ECAs 
was the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) expansion project of 2002 which 
involved the construction of two trains. It was known as the NLNGPlus project and 
at that time was considered as Nigeria's largest project financing and sub-Saharan 
Africa's largest private-sector financed project. It was also described by the Project 
Finance magazine as the "African oil and gas deal of the year" for 2002.
225
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The project involved NLNG, Shell, Total and AGIP as the sponsors and 
ECAs such as the US Ex-Im Bank, the ECGD, Istituto per i Servizi Assicurativi del 
Credito all'Esportazione (SACE) of Italy, and Netherland’s private credit insurer 
Gerling NCM (currently Atradius) arranging loan guarantees of $620 million for a 
period exceeding eight years to the 19 international commercial banks that granted a 
loan towards the expansion. The AfDB and six Nigerian banks were also 
participants. The ECAs undertook to buy the debt from the banks if the borrower 





This chapter focused on the sources of financing. It identifies the sources and 
their roles in the provision of funds, guarantees and insurance. The types of financing 
ie debt and equity were referred to.  Debt financing however featured prominently 
due to the nature of the project. Commercial banks were first tackled as they are the 
principal sources of finance. Secondly, MDBs were also examined especially with 
regards to their different roles in providing finance, guarantees for political risks and 
insurance.  ECAs on the other hand provide cover for political or commercial risk or 
both by providing insurance and guarantees for foreign borrowers or exporters.  
The role of local commercial banks is very crucial. If they can provide 
sufficient funds to finance oil and gas projects in Nigeria with low interest rates, 
most of the failures of IIOCs in the production of oil in marginal fields and oil blocks 
would be reduced as obtaining financing for upstream projects would be much easier. 
IIOCs would not need to seek the assistance of MDBs or ECAs which are often 
expensive, impose stringent conditions and may take considerable time to conclude 
the loan transaction. In addition, it would encourage the participation of more 
indigenous companies in the exploration and production of oil. It is submitted that 
Nigeria should endeavour to strengthen the banking industry and consequently the 
banks through the reform of the sector and the enactment and implementation of 
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adequate banking laws. The Local Content Act should also be effectively monitored 
to ensure compliance.   
Loan syndication by Nigerian banks should be embarked upon as an 
individual bank cannot solely fund a project. Furthermore, there should be genuine 
efforts to enhance political stability in Nigeria as this will motivate foreign 
commercial banks to increase lending to finance projects. 
MDBs also serve a useful role in debt finance. They provide funds for the 
government and also encourage private sector participation. They provide guarantees 
and funds for projects in countries that may not be able to access funds from lenders 
because of their high political risk. An example is the World Bank which grants 
loans. The IFC will be beneficial in granting financial assistance to indigenous oil 
companies as it caters for the private sector. Therefore, it is recommended that these 
companies effectively utilize the services of the IFC. 
Nonetheless, the use of MDBs is not without its drawbacks. For example, the 
interest on the loan granted is often higher than the market value. In addition, MDBs 
may refuse to be involved in a project if there are alternative sources of financing 
available as it is a lender of last resort. Also in practice, the World Bank has not 
rendered much assistance to oil and gas projects in comparison to infrastructural 
projects which seem to be its major focus and is more in line with its goals. The grant 
of financial assistance by the World Bank will probably have conditions attached to 
it which may be difficult for the country concerned to implement.  
ECAs are also important in the financing of oil and gas projects as they 
provide guarantees and insurance cover for exporters and lenders. However, the use 
of ECAs often favours the economy of the exporting countries at the expense of the 
importing countries as they may encourage the use of expensive imports where 
cheaper and equally effective alternatives are available. ECAs are a cause of high 
debts for countries particularly developing countries which have increasing debt 
profiles. ECAs also tend to finance exports from their countries only. 
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It is recommended that indigenous companies should also examine raising 
equity funds from the capital market in Nigeria for oil and gas projects as this 
method of financing has not really been applied in Nigeria. Listing only on foreign 
capital markets without listing on Nigerian capital markets may not be convenient.  If 
the company has a strong brand and a good track-record, it is expected that the 
Nigerian public will purchase the securities. However, the listing may be expensive 
and the requirements complicated for a new company. 
In raising finance for projects, it should be noted that equity finance is very 
relevant. For example, oil exploration projects are often undertaken by means of 
equity finance as lenders rarely advance loans because of the high level of risk 
involved. Also, in other oil and gas projects, the lenders may not be willing to issue 
loans if there is no equity as the equity indicates commitment to the project. 
In analysing the sources of finance listed above, each of the sources used 
individually for a project may not be appropriate for an IIOC in Nigeria in view of 
the risks involved, the low level of technological expertise of the IIOCs and the 
financial situation of the IIOCs. Though, the local banks are improved but it still 
remains to be seen if they have the capacity to solely fund capital intensive projects 
for a long duration even if they form a loan syndicate. Most projects which have 
been funded by Nigerian banks have had the larger part of the project financed by 
foreign banks. Furthermore, foreign banks may be reluctant to finance projects by the 
IIOCs because of their perceived inexperience, risks and uncertain security (in the 
case of marginal fields). The equity of the IIOCs will also be inadequate to finance 
the project. Therefore, the use of project finance is recommended as it takes into 
account these risks. Project finance will include the means of financing discussed 
above in the project company while the IIOC(s) will be the sponsor(s). The lenders 
will be repaid from the cash flow from the project with little or no recourse from the 
sponsor(s). 
Generally, in lending money, lenders have to have some sort of security to 
guarantee that the loan will be repaid. In this case, the loan is to be repaid from the 
cash-flow and assets of the project. Therefore, a security in the form of a mortgage 
can be created over the lease. However, the Petroleum Act places a restriction on the 
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assignment in OPLs and OMLs. The Petroleum Act and Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production) Regulations state that prior to the assignment or transfer of a licence, 
lease or any associated right, power or interest, the consent of the minister for 
Petroleum must be obtained. 
Paragraph 14 of the Petroleum Act provides that: 
“Without the prior consent of the Minister, the holder of an oil 
prospecting licence or an oil mining lease shall not assign his licence 
or lease, or any right, power or interest therein or thereunder.”  
 
Paragraph 4 of the Regulations states that:  
(a) An application for the assignment of an oil prospecting 
licence or oil mining lease (or of an interest in the same) 
shall be made to the Minister in writing and accompanied by 
the prescribed fee; and the applicant shall furnish in respect 
of the assignee all such information as is required to be 
furnished in the case of an applicant for a new licence or 
lease.  
(b) Application for the assignment or takeover of an oil 
prospecting licence or oil mining lease (or of an interest in 
the same) shall be made to the Minister in writing and 
accompanied by the prescribed fees at the discretion of the 
Minister; and the applicant shall furnish in respect of the 
assignment, or takeover, all such information as is required 
to be furnished in the case of an applicant for a new licence 
or lease.” 
This in effect means that the consent of the minister must be obtained before 
a mortgage can be created over the OML. Obtaining the ministerial consent and 
creating the mortgage is often an arduous and time-consuming process. Although the 
Petroleum Act and the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations stated that a 
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written ministerial consent is required prior to the assignment of a licence but it 
could not be determined whether a share transfer could be regarded as an 
assignment.
227
 The purport of the above provision was uncertain until the decision in 
Moni Pulo v Brass Exploratory Exploration Ltd supra was given.  
The DPR has the duty of registering mortgages over OPLs and OMLs. 
Alternatively, a charge can be created over the OML but this will be equitable in 
nature. This does not require the consent of the minister and registration with the 
DPR. The charge can be registered as a debenture by the Corporate Affairs 
Commission which is the companies’ registry in Nigeria. However in the event of a 
default on the payment of the loan or perfection of the security, consent to the 
transfer of the OML may not be granted by the minister and may result in the 
lender’s inability to enforce the security or recover the funds borrowed. The 
importance of the prior consent of the minister was highlighted in the case of Moni 
Pulo v Brass Exploratory supra.228 This requirement is also contained in the draft 
PIB. 
Although it is recognised that the prior consent of the minister is to 
discourage any abuse in the assignment of an interest, it is proposed that the 
conditions for creating a mortgage and obtaining the minister’s consent be made 
conducive to encourage financing. 
It is submitted that if the political and economic condition of a country is 
conducive and the country has a positive credit rating, it will be easier to access 
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There are several oil and gas producing countries in the world with 
distinctive regulatory and contractual frameworks for their upstream oil and 
gas sector and financing the projects. This chapter attempts to analyse the 
Norwegian oil and gas sector in comparison with that of Nigeria’s. Norway 
has been selected because of its reputation as a country with an exemplary 
framework for other countries to emulate and also supports indigenous 
participation. Moreover, the Nigerian draft PIB is modelled after the legal 
framework of the Norwegian oil and gas upstream sector.  
5.2 Brief Overview on Norway  
Norway is a developed country in Europe which derives its revenue 
mainly from the oil and gas. Its oil and gas resources were discovered in 
1969.
229
 Norway possesses the largest reserves of oil and gas in Europe.
230
 It 
is rated fourth in the production of natural gas in the world.
231
  It is also the 




Although Norway is not rated on the 10 top oil and gas producing 
countries, it is regarded globally as a forerunner in upstream activity in 
offshore areas.
233
 It has been described as setting a standard for other 
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countries due to its exemplary and transparent management of its petroleum 
resources and revenue.
234




Norway has promoted indigenous participation in its oil and gas 
sector. In the 1970s, it ensured the transfer of technology by the IOCs through 
contractual provisions by making it a condition in issuing production 
licences.
236 Norway also fostered partnership between IIOCs and IOCs in 
research and development.
237
 Contracts were awarded to IIOCs which offered 




5.3 The Norwegian Legal, Regulatory and Contractual Framework 
Norway’s legal, regulatory and contractual framework is highly 
organised and transparent. The regulatory framework for its upstream oil and 
gas sector has also been consistent.
239
 The main laws regulating the 
Norwegian petroleum sector are the Petroleum Act (Act 29 November 1996 
No. 72 relating to petroleum activities) referred to as the Petroleum Activities 
Act and the regulations issued thereunder (Regulations of 27 June 1997 No. 
653) referred to as the Petroleum Activities Regulations and the Petroleum 
Taxation Act (Act of 13 June 1975 No. 35). Similar to Nigeria, the oil 
resources in Norway are also vested in the state.
240
 The Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy supervises the petroleum sector and the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate regulates the petroleum sector. 
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240 Section 1 (1) of the Petroleum Activities Act. 
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The Petroleum Activities Act and the Petroleum Activities Regulations 
contains the general legal basis for the contractual agreement of licensing 
which governs Norwegian petroleum activities. The Petroleum Act stipulates 
that Norway solely operates the contractual form of concessions. This is done 
through a license which grants IOCs rights of exploration and production.
241
 
The award of the license is usually through a bidding system and is granted 
based on the company’s expertise, experience and work plans. This is also 
similar to the Nigerian system of bidding. There are two types of licences 
granted:  
 The exploration licence 
 The production licence 
The exploration licence is for an initial duration of three years and allows 
the companies granted non-exclusive rights in the area designated solely for 
exploration.
242
 The production license is for an initial period of 10 years 
which can be extended to 30 years or 50 years.
243
  It permits the company to 
exclusively survey, drill and explore for petroleum and thereafter become the 
owner of the petroleum produced.  
Norway imposes a company income tax and petroleum profits tax at a 
rate of 28 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.
244
 The company income tax 
is paid by all companies operating businesses in Norway while the petroleum 
profits tax is imposed on upstream petroleum activities. 
The petroleum sector operates through these companies which are 
monitored by the Ministry. These are:  
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 Gassco  
Statoil 
Statoil is an international energy company which was established in 
1972. It is the Norwegian NOC which has 70 per cent of its shares held by the 
Norwegian government.
245
 Statoil does not solely operate in Norway but also 
has a presence in about 33 countries including Nigeria.
246
 It is the largest 
operator in Norway and manages about 80 per cent of the oil and gas 
production in Norway.   
Previously, oil and gas exploration projects were financed by the state 
through Statoil and by the IOCs. In 1985, the State’s Direct Financial Interest 
(SDFI) was established and was administered by Statoil. Through the SDFI, 
the government acquired interests in several oil and gas activities. It involved 
the use of government funds to invest in the oil and gas upstream sector 
particularly in financing production licences.
247
 The creation of the SDFI 
meant that revenue from the state investments formerly accruing to Statoil 
was transferred to the SDFI. Consequently, Statoil had to finance projects 
with her funds or sourced for loans.
248
 Thus the SDFI acting for the state 
together with the IOCs and Statoil financed projects. In 2001, Petoro was 
created to act as a licensee and oversee the SDFI assets, thus acquiring 
control of the SDFI from Statoil.
249
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In 2001, Statoil was listed on the Oslo stock exchange. In addition, it 
is also listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This enabled it access funds 
from the public to finance projects.
250
 Thus Statoil became ceased to exist as 
a wholly state-owned company and also established itself as an oil company 
in several countries where it also finances its operations by means of equity 
and debt. 
Petoro 
Petoro is a solely state-owned company which was created in 2001 to 
oversee the commercial operations and country’s financial interest in several 
petroleum upstream activities thus transferring the supervisory role of the 
SDFI from Statoil to Petoro. This was as a consequence of the partial 
privatisation and listing of Statoil. It is the licensee for petroleum 
operations.
251
 Unlike Statoil, its role is limited to Norway and does not 
perform the role of an operator. It can however, acquire equity interests in 
any lease in Norway ranging from 20 per cent to 60 per cent.
252
 The 
marketing and sale of the petroleum products are also undertaken by Statoil 
whilst Petoro plays a supervisory role.  
Gassco 
Gassco which is the third company is a state-owned company and 
controls the shipping of natural gas by pipeline. It acts as an operator. 
Unlike Nigeria, Norway does not make utilise project finance in 
financing its upstream projects. This is because it is a low risk and politically 
stable country and therefore has a high credit-rating for the country and 
companies operating in it. Consequently, Norway can obtain cheaper means 
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of finance than project finance and also easily access funds for its projects.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The Norwegian system involves the separation of commercial and 
regulatory roles. This encourages transparency and accountability while 
circumventing a conflict of interest. 
As well as Nigeria, Norway’s oil and gas sector was dominated by 
IOCs in its early stages of development. However, Norway realised the 
benefits of developing her petroleum sector and therefore ensured that the 
indigenous resources were adequately trained by way of technology transfer 
from its contracts with the IOCs and could effectively participate in the 
sector. This in turn led to the building of a formidable and independent NOC 
capable of operating in Norway and other countries. Nigeria can borrow a 
leaf from this and endeavour to develop the technical expertise of her NOC 
and invariably her oil and gas sector by adequate training and indigenous 
participation. 
There should also be a separation of the commercial and regulatory 
roles currently being exercised by the NNPC. This will result in the neutrality 









6. CONCLUSION  
 
This dissertation has shown the various issues bordering on the 
financing of upstream oil and gas projects with emphasis on the challenges of 
raising funds by indigenous oil companies. Financing of petroleum projects 
by indigenous oil companies in Nigeria is preferably achieved through project 
finance mainly because of the high level of risk, huge capital and its long-
term duration. 
 
Closely linked with the issue of financing is that indigenous 
participation. An active indigenous participation in petroleum projects often 
indicates a corresponding high level of technical expertise and financial 
resources. In Nigeria, there has been a low level of indigenous participation 
which somewhat explains the challenge of minimal financing being faced. In 
a bid to resolve the issue, Nigeria introduced the licensing of marginal fields 
and award of oil blocks to indigenous oil companies. 
 
The sources of finance for oil and gas projects are also diverse and 
take into account several risks which may deter the repayment of the 
investment. Financing can be by way of equity and debt obtained from the 
project sponsors, lenders, capital market etc. Debt finance is frequently 
utilized in comparison with equity finance and is also used in project finance. 
Financial assistance can also occur as money, guarantees and insurance. 
 
The Norwegian legal framework for her upstream sector was also 
examined as a model framework to overhaul Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. 
This is proposed to be achieved by the PIB which is adapted from the 
Norwegian legal framework.  
 
The Nigerian government should adopt measures to develop and 
strengthen the oil and gas sector in the long-term rather than focus on short-
term returns. 
It is proposed that in line with the draft PIB and the Norwegian oil 
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and gas sector, there should be a separation of dual roles of commercial and 
regulatory roles by regulatory bodies in Nigeria. If accomplished, this will 
avoid conflict of interest and promote transparency and neutrality in the 
sector. 
Indigenous participation should be promoted in Nigeria to assist in 
facilitating financing and investment in Nigeria. This will improve 
technological expertise which will in turn build and develop the NOC to 
operate in other countries as well as Nigeria and thus, increase the revenue 
accruing to Nigeria. Indigenous oil and gas companies should consider 
merging more often with other indigenous companies or IOCs for some 
projects particularly in cases where two or more companies possess the 
financial capacity and technological expertise to carry out a project. 
Although, there have been several cases of mergers, more mergers should be 
supported as this will accelerate technological advancement and increase 
financing by local commercial banks. 
Indigenous participation will encourage financing as the revenue 
accruing to the indigenous sponsors of the project will be reinvested in 
Nigeria and subsequently can be utilized for future projects.  
Loan syndication by Nigerian banks should be utilized more often in 
project finance for projects. This can be done in conjunction with foreign 
banks to ensure the interest is repatriated to Nigeria.   
The Nigerian government also has a foremost role to play in 
enhancing the political stability in Nigeria so as make it easier to access funds 
from foreign and local commercial banks. Accessing of funds from the 
capital market through the issuing of debt and equity for financing oil and gas 
upstream projects as done in other countries should be encouraged in Nigeria. 
This can be made attractive to investors by providing sufficient information 
on the oil and gas industry and making the process transparent. 
The government can further address environmental damage by 
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ensuring that adequate measures are taken to prevent environmental damage 
while its breach will concurrently attract a heavy penalty and remedy of the 
breach to deter offenders.  This will serve the twin function of tackling 
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